Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)
A sophisticated, well-resourced adversary, often state-sponsored, that gains and maintains prolonged, covert unauthorized access to a network while avoiding detection. The term names the actor; the campaign it runs is APT activity. Vendors track the same group under different names: numbered APT groups for well-established actors, and provisional labels such as Mandiant’s UNC clusters or Microsoft’s Storm- names for activity not yet tied to a known group.
Triage signal: Attribution is rarely a triage question. What you can see is the tradecraft: long dwell time, valid accounts, edge-device exploitation and living-off-the-land tools. Record the observed behavior and leave the name to threat intelligence.
Source: NIST glossaryAI Agent Abuse
Hijacking or misusing an AI agent’s tool access (mail, files, code execution, APIs) so it acts for the attacker, usually through prompt injection in content it reads, a poisoned tool or MCP server, or stolen agent credentials. The agent’s permissions become the attacker’s, and its actions look like normal automation.
Triage signal: Agent tool calls or data sends the user did not request, especially right after the agent read external content; new MCP servers, plugins or connectors; and agent tokens used from outside the agent’s host. Review the agent’s own action log, not only the user’s.
Source: MITRE ATLASApplication Shimming
Abuses the Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure (shims) to inject malicious code or maintain persistence. An ATT&CK Persistence and Privilege Escalation technique.
Triage signal: sdbinst.exe running outside a software install, new .sdb files under C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom, or new values under the AppCompatFlags Custom and InstalledSDB registry keys.
Source: ATT&CK T1546.011Business Logic Abuse
Exploiting flaws in an application’s workflow rather than its code: replaying a single-use coupon, skipping a payment step, or abusing a password-reset flow to take over an account. Every request looks valid on its own, so signature-based controls rarely fire; the signal is a sequence that the business process should not allow.
Triage signal: A per-account or per-session sequence the workflow should not allow: the same coupon redeemed many times, an order confirmed with no payment event, or a reset completed from a session that never received the reset link. Application and business-event logs carry it, not the WAF.
Source: OWASPCollection
ATT&CK tactic: gathering the data the attacker came for (file shares, mailboxes, screenshots, keystrokes) before exfiltration. Archive tools such as 7-Zip or WinRAR creating large password-protected archives are a common tell.
Triage signal: One account reading files across many shares or folders in a short window, mailbox searches or exports (New-MailboxExportRequest, eDiscovery content searches) by someone outside legal or IT, and screenshots or clipboard captures by an unfamiliar process.
Source: ATT&CK TA0009COM Hijacking
A persistence technique that abuses Windows Component Object Model (COM) registry entries to hijack the execution flow of legitimate applications.
Triage signal: New or changed InprocServer32 or LocalServer32 values under HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID pointing to a DLL in a user-writable path, overriding a CLSID registered under HKLM (Sysmon events 12 and 13).
Source: ATT&CK T1546.015Compromised Host
A system under attacker control, often used for lateral movement, staging malware, or maintaining persistence within a network.
Triage signal: A conclusion, not an alert: you call a host compromised when the evidence shows attacker-controlled execution on it. Record that evidence and your confidence, because the label drives containment and scoping.
Defense Impairment
ATT&CK tactic: breaking security mechanisms, pipelines, and tooling so defenders cannot see or trust what is happening: disabling security tools such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) agents (EDR killers, BYOVD), modifying firewalls, and tampering with logging and trust controls. Created in ATT&CK v19 (April 2026) when Defense Evasion was split; the old T1562 Impair Defenses techniques now sit here, chiefly as T1685 Disable or Modify Tools. Pre-ransomware EDR killing is among the highest-signal events an analyst can catch.
Triage signal: A security agent that stops reporting, a new Defender exclusion or tamper event (Defender event 5007), a stopped log forwarder, or a cleared log. Silence from a sensor is evidence: find out why the telemetry stopped before you conclude nothing happened.
Source: ATT&CK TA0112Source: ATT&CK T1685Discovery
ATT&CK tactic: learning the environment after access (whoami, net group “Domain Admins”, nltest, AdFind, BloodHound, cloud role enumeration). A burst of enumeration commands from one account or host is one of the earliest hands-on-keyboard signals.
Triage signal: Several enumeration commands (whoami /all, net group, nltest /domain_trusts, AdFind) from one account within minutes, or a burst of LDAP queries from a workstation, as BloodHound collection produces. Admins run these too, so weigh the account and the host.
Source: ATT&CK TA0007Execution
The ATT&CK tactic (TA0002) for running attacker-controlled code on a local or remote system: through command interpreters, user-run files and lures, scheduled tasks, WMI, or exploits. It rarely stands alone: attackers execute code to discover, steal, move or persist.
Triage signal: A process whose parent does not fit its role: Office or a browser spawning a shell, a script host running from a download folder, or a signed binary with an unusual command line. Process-creation telemetry (Sysmon event 1, Security 4688 with command line) is the evidence.
Source: ATT&CK TA0002Impact (ATT&CK Tactic)
The tactic for the damage itself (TA0040); not to be confused with ASSURED’s impact axis, which C.L.E.A.R. defines. Its techniques include Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486), Inhibit System Recovery such as shadow-copy deletion with vssadmin or bcdedit (T1490), Service Stop (T1489), data destruction, and Resource Hijacking such as cryptomining (T1496). Shadow-copy deletion and backup-service kills usually come minutes before encryption.
Triage signal: Shadow-copy deletion (vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete) or bcdedit recovery changes, backup and database services stopped in a batch, or a sudden spike in file renames. Any one of these on a server needs an immediate look; confirmed, it fires the escalation tripwire.
Source: ATT&CK TA0040Initial Access
The ATT&CK tactic covering how attackers first gain a foothold inside the environment: phishing, exploited edge devices and public-facing applications, valid or stolen credentials, and exposed remote services. Reconnaissance and Resource Development come before it.
Triage signal: The first event that does not fit: a sign-in from a new device or hosting IP, a child process under an internet-facing service, a user-run file from a download or email path. Record when and how it happened, or that it is still unknown, because the rest of the case hangs off this point.
Source: ATT&CK TA0001Initial Access Broker (IAB)
A criminal who breaks in, or buys infostealer logs, and sells the resulting access (VPN credentials, RDP, a web shell) to ransomware and extortion crews. Explains why the intrusion you are triaging may have started weeks earlier under a different actor.
Triage signal: A gap between first access and hands-on activity: a valid-account or web-shell login weeks before the ransomware stage, often from different infrastructure. When you find a foothold, look back for earlier activity on the same credential or host.
Insider
Any person who has or had authorized access to, or knowledge of, an organization’s resources: employees, contractors, vendors and partners, including people who have left while their access or knowledge remains. The word, in CISA’s definition, says nothing about intent; see Insider Risk and Insider Threat.
Triage signal: Insider status is a fact about the account, not a finding: a valid account and expected access are where an insider case starts. Record what the account did. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route, never as analyst-collected notes.
Source: CISAInsider Risk
The potential for harm from anyone with legitimate access, whether through mistakes, negligence, policy violations, well-meaning workarounds or deliberate misuse. It is the umbrella term, and most insider risk is not malicious. Insider threat is the deliberate subset. Some frameworks, including CISA’s, fold the whole spectrum into ‘insider threat’, so map these labels to your organization’s policy vocabulary.
Triage signal: Observable technical activity only: unusual data volume, new destinations, access outside the role, bypassed policy controls. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route, never as analyst-collected notes.
Source: CISAInsider Risk Management (IRM)
The program and tool category that watches for insider risk: user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA), data loss prevention (DLP) and privileged access management (PAM), often joined to HR data through connectors. It is deployed only after legal and privacy review (and works-council review where one exists), and it is the route by which HR-held context reaches a case.
Triage signal: IRM alerts arrive as policy matches on technical activity (data movement, access outside the role). Work them like any alert: record what the account did. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route, never as analyst-collected notes.
Insider Threat
A person with authorized access who uses it to harm the organization. CISA’s definition covers malicious, complacent and unintentional acts; many programs, ASSURED included, reserve ‘insider threat’ for the malicious subset and use ‘insider risk’ for the broader set.
Triage signal: The same evidence as any insider case: what the account did, from where, to which data. Intent is not a triage call; record the activity and route it through the insider-risk process.
Source: CISAJailbreaking
Two senses. (1) Mobile: removing iOS or Android platform restrictions, usually by the device owner and sometimes by an attacker; for triage, a jailbroken or rooted device fails MDM compliance and cannot be trusted to enforce app sandboxing. (2) AI: prompts crafted to make a large language model ignore its safety policy; related to prompt injection (OWASP LLM01) and catalogued in MITRE ATLAS.
Triage signal: Mobile: an MDM compliance failure for a jailbroken or rooted device that still holds corporate sessions. AI: prompts in the AI gateway or audit log telling the model to ignore its instructions or role-play past its policy, followed by output the policy should have blocked.
Source: OWASP LLM01Lateral Movement
Moving from the initial foothold to other hosts, identities or tenants to find sensitive data or reach higher-value targets (ATT&CK tactic TA0008). It usually rides legitimate remote-access protocols (RDP, SMB, WinRM, SSH) with stolen credentials, or replays a stolen session into a cloud or SaaS tenant, so the signal is an account authenticating where it does not normally go. Each hop widens the blast radius, and confirmed lateral movement is an escalation criterion.
Triage signal: Network logons (4624 type 3) or RDP logons (type 10) fanning out from one source, remote service creation (7045), or PsExec-style named pipes. The source host is your next scoping target.
Source: ATT&CK TA0008Leaver Window
The period around a known departure, roughly the notice period, when insider data theft is most likely: CERT research on insider theft of intellectual property found that many of those who took data did so within about a month of leaving. The departure date reaches the SOC as a date, not as a reason to suspect anyone.
Triage signal: Bulk repository clones, mass downloads, uploads to personal storage or USB writes during the notice period, measured against the person’s own baseline and peer baselines. See Subject: insider analysis.
Lethal Trifecta
An AI agent that combines three capabilities: access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and a way to send data out (links or images it renders, web fetches, email, tool calls). With all three, a prompt injection hidden in the untrusted content can make the agent read the private data and send it to the attacker. Removing any one leg breaks that path. The name is Simon Willison’s (June 2025). A triage assistant holds the first two legs by design, so ASSURED’s admission gate removes the third; see Governing automated triage.
Triage signal: In a case involving an AI assistant or agent, list the three legs: what data it could read, what untrusted content it processed, and which outbound channels it could use. An agent with all three that read attacker-reachable content is a possible exfiltration path; check its action log for sends, fetches or rendered links the user did not request.
Source: Simon Willison (2025)Malware
Software designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to systems. Encompasses ransomware, trojans, worms, viruses, spyware, wipers, rootkits, and the other malware types catalogued below.
Triage signal: A detection name tells you the family at best. Establish whether it executed (process, network or persistence evidence), not only whether a file was written. A file that a control blocked or quarantined, with no execution or follow-on evidence, is the contained-by-control path (recorded at P3 or P4, a pattern-entry candidate); malware that ran is a different case.
Source: NIST glossaryPersistence
The ATT&CK tactic for keeping access across reboots, updates and password changes. Mature actors plant several anchors: Run keys, scheduled tasks, services, WMI event subscriptions, and in the cloud, OAuth apps and added MFA methods.
Triage signal: New Run keys, services (7045), scheduled tasks (4698), WMI subscriptions (Sysmon 19 to 21), and in the cloud new OAuth consents, app credentials or MFA methods. When you find one anchor, hunt for the others: actors rarely plant only one.
Source: ATT&CK TA0003Post-Exploitation
Everything the attacker does after the first foothold: exploring the environment, escalating access, exfiltrating data, or setting up long-term control.
Triage signal: Hands-on-keyboard behavior after the first alert: discovery commands, credential access, remote logons. Its presence moves the case from ‘was there a foothold?’ to ‘how far did they get?’.
Privilege Chaining
The sequential use of multiple smaller privilege escalations or credential compromises to progressively gain more powerful access. Each step may look minor on its own (a misconfigured service, a readable credential file, an over-broad group membership), which is why tools such as BloodHound model attack paths rather than single permissions.
Triage signal: Several small privilege changes on one identity or host in a short span: a new group membership, a token or service abuse, then a logon to a more sensitive tier. Score the chain, not each step.
Privilege Escalation
The ATT&CK tactic for gaining higher permissions: on the endpoint, standard user to admin to SYSTEM; in the directory or cloud, a regular account to domain admin or a privileged cloud role.
Triage signal: A SYSTEM or root process whose parent ran as a standard user, a new member in a privileged group (4728, 4732, 4756), or a privileged cloud role assigned outside change management.
Source: ATT&CK TA0004Prompt Injection
Text that an AI system reads as instructions instead of data: typed directly by a user, or hidden in an email, web page or document the model processes (indirect prompt injection). In agentic tools it can trigger actions with the agent’s permissions. OWASP ranks it first among LLM risks (LLM01).
Triage signal: In AI tool logs, an assistant or agent acting on instructions that came from content it read (an email, a page, a document) rather than from the user, especially a tool call, link or data send the user never asked for.
Source: OWASP LLM01Reconnaissance
The pre-attack phase where attackers gather intelligence, enumerate exposed services, and identify vulnerabilities before launching an intrusion. ATT&CK v19.2 also tracks attackers querying public AI services to research targets (T1682).
Triage signal: Mostly invisible: it happens on public sources. You see its edges: scanning of external services, account-enumeration probes against sign-in endpoints, and phishing that cites details only an org chart would give.
Source: ATT&CK TA0043Remote Execution
Running commands or malicious code on a target system from another host: PsExec and remote service creation, WMI and WinRM, scheduled tasks created remotely, SSH, or an exploit against a network service. Administrators do all of this legitimately, so the account and the source host decide the call.
Triage signal: A process on the target whose parent is services.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe or wsmprovhost.exe, preceded by a network logon from another host. Pair the target’s process telemetry with the source’s logon.
Resource Development
ATT&CK tactic: building or acquiring what the attack needs before it starts (registering look-alike domains, buying access or infostealer logs, compromising servers or routers to use as relays, staging tools).
Triage signal: Usually outside your telemetry. The traces arrive later: a newly registered look-alike domain in a phishing email, a sign-in from compromised router or VPS infrastructure, or one of your credentials in infostealer logs.
Source: ATT&CK TA0042Sandbox Escape
An attack that breaks out of a restricted environment (browser sandbox, container, or VM) to reach the underlying host. Most often seen as browser sandbox escapes chained with a renderer bug. ATT&CK T1611 Escape to Host covers both container breakouts and virtual-machine-to-hypervisor escapes (for example, on ESXi).
Triage signal: A browser, container or VM process spawning something it should never spawn (a shell from a browser renderer, a host process from a container), or an unexpected kernel or hypervisor crash on the host.
Source: ATT&CK T1611SQL Injection
Code injection where crafted input changes the SQL query an application sends to its database, letting the attacker read or change data, bypass logins, and sometimes run commands on the database server. Prevented by parameterized queries; web application firewalls catch common payloads but not all of them.
Triage signal: SQL syntax in request parameters (quotes, UNION SELECT, sleep or WAITFOR DELAY), database errors returned to the client, or response sizes that jump for one parameter. Check whether the database logged matching queries before you call it successful.
Source: OWASPStaged Payloads
A two-phase delivery process where a lightweight stager downloads and executes a more complex secondary payload. Payload deployment, the delivery and installation of the attacker’s tools, usually works this way: a dropper, script or stager fetches and runs the real implant.
Triage signal: A small first-stage process (script host, mshta, rundll32, a loader DLL) making an outbound request, then a new process or injected memory within seconds. Capture the second-stage URL: it often names the C2.
Stealth
ATT&CK tactic: hiding and concealing actions so they appear as normal behavior, through obfuscation, masquerading, process injection, and indicator removal. In ATT&CK v19 (April 2026), Defense Evasion was split: Stealth kept the TA0005 ID, and the new Defense Impairment (TA0112) took the defense-breaking techniques. Rules written against ‘Defense Evasion’ still match TA0005, but not Defense Impairment.
Triage signal: Something trusted behaving in an untrusted way: a system binary with an odd command line or path, a signed process loading an unsigned DLL, encoded scripts. The name looks normal; the context does not.
Source: ATT&CK TA0005System Tampering
The unauthorized modification of system configurations, binaries, or behaviors to support attacker goals or disrupt operations: changing boot settings, replacing or patching system files, editing the hosts file or firewall rules, or weakening security settings. In ATT&CK terms most of it falls under Defense Impairment or Impact.
Triage signal: Configuration changes with no change record: bcdedit, netsh advfirewall, hosts-file writes, registry edits to security settings, or system binaries that fail signature checks.
Toxic Combination
An access-governance term: multiple individually benign roles or permissions that together create excessive, dangerous access (the classic separation-of-duties conflict). A condition attackers hunt for and access reviews exist to catch.
Triage signal: An access review or cloud entitlement tool flagging one identity that can both create and approve a payment, or both write and deploy code. In a case, check whether the activity under review used such a combination.
UAC Bypass
Circumventing Windows User Account Control prompts so a process run by a local administrator reaches high integrity without the consent prompt. It does not elevate a standard user.
Triage signal: A high-integrity process spawned by an auto-elevating binary (fodhelper.exe, eventvwr.exe, computerdefaults.exe) right after a registry change under HKCU\Software\Classes\ms-settings or mscfile.
Source: ATT&CK T1548.002WMI Event Subscription
A filter, consumer and binding stored in the WMI repository that runs attacker code when an event fires (logon, a timer). It is fileless and survives reboots. A Persistence technique; for WMI used to run commands, see WMI Abuse under Execution.
Triage signal: Sysmon events 19, 20 and 21 (WMI filter, consumer and binding), WMI-Activity event 5861, or Get-CimInstance against root\subscription returning a CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer you cannot explain.
Source: ATT&CK T1546.003Zero Day
A vulnerability with no available patch, either because the vendor does not yet know about it or has not yet shipped a fix. Exploitation is not required for the term; when attackers exploit it before a fix exists, that is a zero-day attack (the NIST definition cited here). Once a patch exists but has not been applied, the bug is an n-day.
Triage signal: No signature exists yet, so detection is behavioral: an edge or server process doing something new (spawning a shell, writing files to web directories, new outbound connections). Check vendor advisories and the CISA KEV catalog against your exposed versions.
Source: NIST glossary