THE B.A.D. GLOSSARY · FIELD REFERENCE

Threat Behavior & Adversary Reference

Behaviors. Adversaries. Damage.

A working reference to the language of compromise: what attackers do, who they are, and the damage they leave behind. The techniques, the actors, the campaigns, and the artifacts an analyst will name out loud during triage. The technique sections follow an intrusion from first access to data theft; vulnerabilities, malware, actors and campaigns come after. Each technique, malware and actor card ends with a triage signal (what the behavior looks like in the evidence), and each campaign card ends with the lesson it holds for triage.

Core adversarial techniques

Foundational behaviors, attacker techniques, and broad offensive concepts.

Vocabulary for: Alert · Uncover

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)

A sophisticated, well-resourced adversary, often state-sponsored, that gains and maintains prolonged, covert unauthorized access to a network while avoiding detection. The term names the actor; the campaign it runs is APT activity. Vendors track the same group under different names: numbered APT groups for well-established actors, and provisional labels such as Mandiant’s UNC clusters or Microsoft’s Storm- names for activity not yet tied to a known group.

Triage signal: Attribution is rarely a triage question. What you can see is the tradecraft: long dwell time, valid accounts, edge-device exploitation and living-off-the-land tools. Record the observed behavior and leave the name to threat intelligence.

Source: NIST glossary

AI Agent Abuse

Hijacking or misusing an AI agent’s tool access (mail, files, code execution, APIs) so it acts for the attacker, usually through prompt injection in content it reads, a poisoned tool or MCP server, or stolen agent credentials. The agent’s permissions become the attacker’s, and its actions look like normal automation.

Triage signal: Agent tool calls or data sends the user did not request, especially right after the agent read external content; new MCP servers, plugins or connectors; and agent tokens used from outside the agent’s host. Review the agent’s own action log, not only the user’s.

Source: MITRE ATLAS

Application Shimming

Abuses the Windows Application Compatibility Infrastructure (shims) to inject malicious code or maintain persistence. An ATT&CK Persistence and Privilege Escalation technique.

Triage signal: sdbinst.exe running outside a software install, new .sdb files under C:\Windows\AppPatch\Custom, or new values under the AppCompatFlags Custom and InstalledSDB registry keys.

Source: ATT&CK T1546.011

Business Logic Abuse

Exploiting flaws in an application’s workflow rather than its code: replaying a single-use coupon, skipping a payment step, or abusing a password-reset flow to take over an account. Every request looks valid on its own, so signature-based controls rarely fire; the signal is a sequence that the business process should not allow.

Triage signal: A per-account or per-session sequence the workflow should not allow: the same coupon redeemed many times, an order confirmed with no payment event, or a reset completed from a session that never received the reset link. Application and business-event logs carry it, not the WAF.

Source: OWASP

Collection

ATT&CK tactic: gathering the data the attacker came for (file shares, mailboxes, screenshots, keystrokes) before exfiltration. Archive tools such as 7-Zip or WinRAR creating large password-protected archives are a common tell.

Triage signal: One account reading files across many shares or folders in a short window, mailbox searches or exports (New-MailboxExportRequest, eDiscovery content searches) by someone outside legal or IT, and screenshots or clipboard captures by an unfamiliar process.

Source: ATT&CK TA0009

COM Hijacking

A persistence technique that abuses Windows Component Object Model (COM) registry entries to hijack the execution flow of legitimate applications.

Triage signal: New or changed InprocServer32 or LocalServer32 values under HKCU\Software\Classes\CLSID pointing to a DLL in a user-writable path, overriding a CLSID registered under HKLM (Sysmon events 12 and 13).

Source: ATT&CK T1546.015

Compromised Host

A system under attacker control, often used for lateral movement, staging malware, or maintaining persistence within a network.

Triage signal: A conclusion, not an alert: you call a host compromised when the evidence shows attacker-controlled execution on it. Record that evidence and your confidence, because the label drives containment and scoping.

Defense Impairment

ATT&CK tactic: breaking security mechanisms, pipelines, and tooling so defenders cannot see or trust what is happening: disabling security tools such as endpoint detection and response (EDR) agents (EDR killers, BYOVD), modifying firewalls, and tampering with logging and trust controls. Created in ATT&CK v19 (April 2026) when Defense Evasion was split; the old T1562 Impair Defenses techniques now sit here, chiefly as T1685 Disable or Modify Tools. Pre-ransomware EDR killing is among the highest-signal events an analyst can catch.

Triage signal: A security agent that stops reporting, a new Defender exclusion or tamper event (Defender event 5007), a stopped log forwarder, or a cleared log. Silence from a sensor is evidence: find out why the telemetry stopped before you conclude nothing happened.

Source: ATT&CK TA0112Source: ATT&CK T1685

Discovery

ATT&CK tactic: learning the environment after access (whoami, net group “Domain Admins”, nltest, AdFind, BloodHound, cloud role enumeration). A burst of enumeration commands from one account or host is one of the earliest hands-on-keyboard signals.

Triage signal: Several enumeration commands (whoami /all, net group, nltest /domain_trusts, AdFind) from one account within minutes, or a burst of LDAP queries from a workstation, as BloodHound collection produces. Admins run these too, so weigh the account and the host.

Source: ATT&CK TA0007

Execution

The ATT&CK tactic (TA0002) for running attacker-controlled code on a local or remote system: through command interpreters, user-run files and lures, scheduled tasks, WMI, or exploits. It rarely stands alone: attackers execute code to discover, steal, move or persist.

Triage signal: A process whose parent does not fit its role: Office or a browser spawning a shell, a script host running from a download folder, or a signed binary with an unusual command line. Process-creation telemetry (Sysmon event 1, Security 4688 with command line) is the evidence.

Source: ATT&CK TA0002

Impact (ATT&CK Tactic)

The tactic for the damage itself (TA0040); not to be confused with ASSURED’s impact axis, which C.L.E.A.R. defines. Its techniques include Data Encrypted for Impact (T1486), Inhibit System Recovery such as shadow-copy deletion with vssadmin or bcdedit (T1490), Service Stop (T1489), data destruction, and Resource Hijacking such as cryptomining (T1496). Shadow-copy deletion and backup-service kills usually come minutes before encryption.

Triage signal: Shadow-copy deletion (vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete) or bcdedit recovery changes, backup and database services stopped in a batch, or a sudden spike in file renames. Any one of these on a server needs an immediate look; confirmed, it fires the escalation tripwire.

Source: ATT&CK TA0040

Initial Access

The ATT&CK tactic covering how attackers first gain a foothold inside the environment: phishing, exploited edge devices and public-facing applications, valid or stolen credentials, and exposed remote services. Reconnaissance and Resource Development come before it.

Triage signal: The first event that does not fit: a sign-in from a new device or hosting IP, a child process under an internet-facing service, a user-run file from a download or email path. Record when and how it happened, or that it is still unknown, because the rest of the case hangs off this point.

Source: ATT&CK TA0001

Initial Access Broker (IAB)

A criminal who breaks in, or buys infostealer logs, and sells the resulting access (VPN credentials, RDP, a web shell) to ransomware and extortion crews. Explains why the intrusion you are triaging may have started weeks earlier under a different actor.

Triage signal: A gap between first access and hands-on activity: a valid-account or web-shell login weeks before the ransomware stage, often from different infrastructure. When you find a foothold, look back for earlier activity on the same credential or host.

Insider

Any person who has or had authorized access to, or knowledge of, an organization’s resources: employees, contractors, vendors and partners, including people who have left while their access or knowledge remains. The word, in CISA’s definition, says nothing about intent; see Insider Risk and Insider Threat.

Triage signal: Insider status is a fact about the account, not a finding: a valid account and expected access are where an insider case starts. Record what the account did. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route, never as analyst-collected notes.

Source: CISA

Insider Risk

The potential for harm from anyone with legitimate access, whether through mistakes, negligence, policy violations, well-meaning workarounds or deliberate misuse. It is the umbrella term, and most insider risk is not malicious. Insider threat is the deliberate subset. Some frameworks, including CISA’s, fold the whole spectrum into ‘insider threat’, so map these labels to your organization’s policy vocabulary.

Triage signal: Observable technical activity only: unusual data volume, new destinations, access outside the role, bypassed policy controls. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route, never as analyst-collected notes.

Source: CISA

Insider Risk Management (IRM)

The program and tool category that watches for insider risk: user and entity behavior analytics (UEBA), data loss prevention (DLP) and privileged access management (PAM), often joined to HR data through connectors. It is deployed only after legal and privacy review (and works-council review where one exists), and it is the route by which HR-held context reaches a case.

Triage signal: IRM alerts arrive as policy matches on technical activity (data movement, access outside the role). Work them like any alert: record what the account did. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route, never as analyst-collected notes.

Insider Threat

A person with authorized access who uses it to harm the organization. CISA’s definition covers malicious, complacent and unintentional acts; many programs, ASSURED included, reserve ‘insider threat’ for the malicious subset and use ‘insider risk’ for the broader set.

Triage signal: The same evidence as any insider case: what the account did, from where, to which data. Intent is not a triage call; record the activity and route it through the insider-risk process.

Source: CISA

Jailbreaking

Two senses. (1) Mobile: removing iOS or Android platform restrictions, usually by the device owner and sometimes by an attacker; for triage, a jailbroken or rooted device fails MDM compliance and cannot be trusted to enforce app sandboxing. (2) AI: prompts crafted to make a large language model ignore its safety policy; related to prompt injection (OWASP LLM01) and catalogued in MITRE ATLAS.

Triage signal: Mobile: an MDM compliance failure for a jailbroken or rooted device that still holds corporate sessions. AI: prompts in the AI gateway or audit log telling the model to ignore its instructions or role-play past its policy, followed by output the policy should have blocked.

Source: OWASP LLM01

Leaver Window

The period around a known departure, roughly the notice period, when insider data theft is most likely: CERT research on insider theft of intellectual property found that many of those who took data did so within about a month of leaving. The departure date reaches the SOC as a date, not as a reason to suspect anyone.

Triage signal: Bulk repository clones, mass downloads, uploads to personal storage or USB writes during the notice period, measured against the person’s own baseline and peer baselines. See Subject: insider analysis.

Lethal Trifecta

An AI agent that combines three capabilities: access to private data, exposure to untrusted content, and a way to send data out (links or images it renders, web fetches, email, tool calls). With all three, a prompt injection hidden in the untrusted content can make the agent read the private data and send it to the attacker. Removing any one leg breaks that path. The name is Simon Willison’s (June 2025). A triage assistant holds the first two legs by design, so ASSURED’s admission gate removes the third; see Governing automated triage.

Triage signal: In a case involving an AI assistant or agent, list the three legs: what data it could read, what untrusted content it processed, and which outbound channels it could use. An agent with all three that read attacker-reachable content is a possible exfiltration path; check its action log for sends, fetches or rendered links the user did not request.

Source: Simon Willison (2025)

Malware

Software designed to disrupt, damage, or gain unauthorized access to systems. Encompasses ransomware, trojans, worms, viruses, spyware, wipers, rootkits, and the other malware types catalogued below.

Triage signal: A detection name tells you the family at best. Establish whether it executed (process, network or persistence evidence), not only whether a file was written. A file that a control blocked or quarantined, with no execution or follow-on evidence, is the contained-by-control path (recorded at P3 or P4, a pattern-entry candidate); malware that ran is a different case.

Source: NIST glossary

Post-Exploitation

Everything the attacker does after the first foothold: exploring the environment, escalating access, exfiltrating data, or setting up long-term control.

Triage signal: Hands-on-keyboard behavior after the first alert: discovery commands, credential access, remote logons. Its presence moves the case from ‘was there a foothold?’ to ‘how far did they get?’.

Privilege Chaining

The sequential use of multiple smaller privilege escalations or credential compromises to progressively gain more powerful access. Each step may look minor on its own (a misconfigured service, a readable credential file, an over-broad group membership), which is why tools such as BloodHound model attack paths rather than single permissions.

Triage signal: Several small privilege changes on one identity or host in a short span: a new group membership, a token or service abuse, then a logon to a more sensitive tier. Score the chain, not each step.

Prompt Injection

Text that an AI system reads as instructions instead of data: typed directly by a user, or hidden in an email, web page or document the model processes (indirect prompt injection). In agentic tools it can trigger actions with the agent’s permissions. OWASP ranks it first among LLM risks (LLM01).

Triage signal: In AI tool logs, an assistant or agent acting on instructions that came from content it read (an email, a page, a document) rather than from the user, especially a tool call, link or data send the user never asked for.

Source: OWASP LLM01

Reconnaissance

The pre-attack phase where attackers gather intelligence, enumerate exposed services, and identify vulnerabilities before launching an intrusion. ATT&CK v19.2 also tracks attackers querying public AI services to research targets (T1682).

Triage signal: Mostly invisible: it happens on public sources. You see its edges: scanning of external services, account-enumeration probes against sign-in endpoints, and phishing that cites details only an org chart would give.

Source: ATT&CK TA0043

Remote Execution

Running commands or malicious code on a target system from another host: PsExec and remote service creation, WMI and WinRM, scheduled tasks created remotely, SSH, or an exploit against a network service. Administrators do all of this legitimately, so the account and the source host decide the call.

Triage signal: A process on the target whose parent is services.exe, WmiPrvSE.exe or wsmprovhost.exe, preceded by a network logon from another host. Pair the target’s process telemetry with the source’s logon.

Resource Development

ATT&CK tactic: building or acquiring what the attack needs before it starts (registering look-alike domains, buying access or infostealer logs, compromising servers or routers to use as relays, staging tools).

Triage signal: Usually outside your telemetry. The traces arrive later: a newly registered look-alike domain in a phishing email, a sign-in from compromised router or VPS infrastructure, or one of your credentials in infostealer logs.

Source: ATT&CK TA0042

Sandbox Escape

An attack that breaks out of a restricted environment (browser sandbox, container, or VM) to reach the underlying host. Most often seen as browser sandbox escapes chained with a renderer bug. ATT&CK T1611 Escape to Host covers both container breakouts and virtual-machine-to-hypervisor escapes (for example, on ESXi).

Triage signal: A browser, container or VM process spawning something it should never spawn (a shell from a browser renderer, a host process from a container), or an unexpected kernel or hypervisor crash on the host.

Source: ATT&CK T1611

Staged Payloads

A two-phase delivery process where a lightweight stager downloads and executes a more complex secondary payload. Payload deployment, the delivery and installation of the attacker’s tools, usually works this way: a dropper, script or stager fetches and runs the real implant.

Triage signal: A small first-stage process (script host, mshta, rundll32, a loader DLL) making an outbound request, then a new process or injected memory within seconds. Capture the second-stage URL: it often names the C2.

Stealth

ATT&CK tactic: hiding and concealing actions so they appear as normal behavior, through obfuscation, masquerading, process injection, and indicator removal. In ATT&CK v19 (April 2026), Defense Evasion was split: Stealth kept the TA0005 ID, and the new Defense Impairment (TA0112) took the defense-breaking techniques. Rules written against ‘Defense Evasion’ still match TA0005, but not Defense Impairment.

Triage signal: Something trusted behaving in an untrusted way: a system binary with an odd command line or path, a signed process loading an unsigned DLL, encoded scripts. The name looks normal; the context does not.

Source: ATT&CK TA0005

System Tampering

The unauthorized modification of system configurations, binaries, or behaviors to support attacker goals or disrupt operations: changing boot settings, replacing or patching system files, editing the hosts file or firewall rules, or weakening security settings. In ATT&CK terms most of it falls under Defense Impairment or Impact.

Triage signal: Configuration changes with no change record: bcdedit, netsh advfirewall, hosts-file writes, registry edits to security settings, or system binaries that fail signature checks.

Toxic Combination

An access-governance term: multiple individually benign roles or permissions that together create excessive, dangerous access (the classic separation-of-duties conflict). A condition attackers hunt for and access reviews exist to catch.

Triage signal: An access review or cloud entitlement tool flagging one identity that can both create and approve a payment, or both write and deploy code. In a case, check whether the activity under review used such a combination.

WMI Event Subscription

A filter, consumer and binding stored in the WMI repository that runs attacker code when an event fires (logon, a timer). It is fileless and survives reboots. A Persistence technique; for WMI used to run commands, see WMI Abuse under Execution.

Triage signal: Sysmon events 19, 20 and 21 (WMI filter, consumer and binding), WMI-Activity event 5861, or Get-CimInstance against root\subscription returning a CommandLineEventConsumer or ActiveScriptEventConsumer you cannot explain.

Source: ATT&CK T1546.003
host-1host-2host-3host-4
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Lateral Movement

Adversary traversal across an environment after initial access. Each hop expands the blast radius and adds new entities for Subject to map. In real intrusions the movement is rarely linear and often piggybacks on legitimate authentication.

useradminSYSTEMdomain admin
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Privilege Escalation

The climb from standard user to admin to SYSTEM to domain admin. Local escalation (user to admin to SYSTEM) is noisy on the endpoint; the jump to domain or cloud admin often happens through stolen credentials and shows up only in identity logs (a new privileged role assignment, an IAM role chained to another). Watching both planes is what catches the climb in progress, and that is the difference between a contained incident and a full domain compromise.

Run keyHKLM…\RunScheduled taskat 02:00 dailyServiceauto-startWMI event subon logon✓✓✓✓
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Persistence

Why removing the malware is rarely enough. Mature adversaries plant multiple anchors (registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, services, WMI event subscriptions) so reboots, password resets, and even partial cleanups leave at least one foothold intact. The same logic holds in the identity plane (a new OAuth app grant, an extra multi-factor authentication (MFA) method, a mailbox forwarding rule, a federated-domain change) and on Linux and macOS (cron or systemd units, authorized_keys, LaunchAgents). Defenders need to enumerate every place persistence might hide before they can call a host or an account clean.

login.php?user=’ OR ‘1’=‘1’ — ↓ becomes SQL:SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='' OR ‘1’=‘1’ — ’ AND pw=’…’→ tautology returns all rows
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SQL Injection

Untrusted input concatenated straight into a SQL query. The classic payload ’ OR ‘1’=‘1’ — (the space after the dashes matters in MySQL) turns the query into a tautology and returns every row, and the rest of the original query becomes a comment: SELECT * FROM users WHERE name=” OR ‘1’=‘1’ — ’ AND pw=’…’. The same characters get parsed as syntax instead of data. The fix is parameterized queries (prepared statements), which keep input as data.

0days to prepareCVE-pending · exploit live
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Zero Day

The counter sits at zero: defenders have had no days to prepare. The vendor has not shipped a fix and may not yet know the bug exists. Until a fix ships, exploitation outpaces mitigation. Once a patch drops, attackers diff it and mass exploitation of unpatched systems often follows within days (at that point the bug is an n-day). The most valuable zero-days are never publicly disclosed at all.

UACelevate?bypassed via auto-elevating binary (fodhelper, sdclt…)
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UAC Bypass

Windows User Account Control should prompt before elevation. Bypass techniques abuse auto-elevating Windows binaries that read attacker-writable HKCU registry keys (fodhelper.exe’s ms-settings handler is the classic; computerdefaults.exe and sdclt.exe have similar variants, while the old eventvwr.exe mscfile hijack was fixed in Windows 10 1703). The consent prompt never fires. UAC is a defense-in-depth feature, not a security boundary, and Microsoft does not service bypasses as vulnerabilities. These bypasses only work for an account that is already a local administrator, running at medium integrity with UAC set below ‘Always notify’; they lift the process to high integrity without the consent prompt. A standard user gets a credential prompt that these tricks do not skip. So a confirmed UAC bypass also tells you the compromised account holds local admin rights, which is itself a finding.

Initial access techniques

Entry vectors attackers use to gain a first foothold.

Vocabulary for: Alert · Uncover

Callback Phishing

An email with no link or attachment (a fake invoice or subscription renewal) that tells the victim to call a phone number. The call center then talks them into installing remote-access software. Defeats link and attachment scanning entirely.

Triage signal: An email with an invoice or renewal and a phone number but no link, then a remote-access tool installed by the user within the hour. Search all mailboxes for the same sender or phone number.

Source: ATT&CK T1566.004

Deepfake Impersonation

Using AI-generated voice or video to pose as a real person (an executive, IT staff, a job candidate) on a call or video meeting. In early 2024 an employee of the engineering firm Arup in Hong Kong paid out about US$25 million after a video call on which every other participant was a deepfake. ATT&CK v19.2 tracks the content creation as Generate Content: Audio-Visual Content (T1683.002).

Triage signal: A payment, reset or access request made on a call or video meeting that skips the normal approval path, often with urgency and secrecy. Recognizing a voice or face is not proof of identity: verify through a known, separate channel.

Source: ATT&CK T1683.002

DPRK Remote IT Workers

North Korean operatives who get hired as remote IT contractors under stolen or fabricated identities (Microsoft: Jasper Sleet), then earn salaries for the regime, steal data, and sometimes extort the employer. A hiring and insider-risk scenario as much as an intrusion. See Lazarus Group.

Triage signal: A corporate laptop shipped to a forwarding address, remote-control tools or IP-KVM devices IT never deployed, sign-ins whose geolocation or network does not match where the laptop should be, and identity, payroll and HR records that disagree.

Drive-by Download

Compromise triggered by visiting a malicious or compromised site. The classic form was a silent browser exploit served by an exploit kit. Today it is usually a fake browser update or fake CAPTCHA that persuades the user to download or paste-and-run something (SocGholish, ClickFix). Fully silent exploit chains still exist but are rare and mostly used in targeted watering-hole attacks.

Triage signal: A browser spawning a script host or installer, a fake-update file (JS or MSI) in Downloads, or a paste-and-run command right after a site visit.

Source: ATT&CK T1189

Email Attachment Exploit

Malware or exploit code embedded in an email attachment that runs when the user opens it, either through a document vulnerability (Follina, the Equation Editor bug) or by persuading the user to enable content or run a file. ATT&CK files it under Spearphishing Attachment (T1566.001).

Triage signal: An Office, PDF or archive process spawning a shell, script host or msdt shortly after a mail client opened the attachment. Find the message and check who else received it.

Source: ATT&CK T1566.001

Exploit Public-Facing Application

Targets vulnerabilities in externally exposed applications (web servers, APIs, file-transfer platforms, VPN and other edge appliances) to gain unauthorized access or remote code execution (ATT&CK T1190). Edge devices and file-transfer platforms have been its most exploited targets in recent years.

Triage signal: A web or application server process spawning a shell, new files in web directories, and odd requests or error spikes in WAF and application logs just before. Check the exposed version against the CISA KEV catalog.

Source: ATT&CK T1190

Exposed Remote Services (RDP, VPN, Citrix)

Logging in through internet-facing remote services (RDP, VPN, Citrix, other edge appliances) with stolen, bought or guessed credentials, or by exploiting the appliance itself. A leading initial-access vector that often leaves no endpoint telemetry, so VPN and appliance logs are the evidence. Using RDP from inside the network to move between hosts is Lateral Movement (T1021.001).

Triage signal: Successful VPN or remote-gateway sign-ins from new countries, hosting providers or residential proxies, especially without MFA, followed by internal RDP or SMB from the VPN address pool.

Source: ATT&CK T1133Source: ATT&CK T1021.001

Help-Desk Social Engineering

Calling the IT help desk while posing as an employee to get a password reset, MFA reset or new MFA device registered. Scattered Spider’s signature entry path.

Triage signal: An MFA method change or reset shortly followed by a sign-in from a new device or location.

Source: CISA AA23-320A

Malvertising

Paid ads, especially search ads, that impersonate legitimate software downloads and lead to trojanized installers (often loaders or infostealers). Sibling technique: SEO poisoning (T1608.006), which games organic search results instead of buying ads.

Triage signal: A search-ad click to a look-alike download site, then an installer for a common tool from that domain, signed by an unfamiliar publisher or not signed at all.

Source: ATT&CK T1583.008Source: ATT&CK T1608.006

Quishing (QR-Code Phishing)

Phishing that hides the link in a QR code, often in an email or a printed notice, so the victim opens it on a phone outside corporate web filtering and email link scanning.

Triage signal: Emails carrying a QR-code image with little text, often about MFA or document signing, followed by sign-ins from mobile devices or IPs the user never used.

Source: ATT&CK T1566

Smishing (SMS Phishing)

Phishing by text message: fake delivery notices, toll bills, or “IT support” texts that lead to a credential-harvesting page or a malicious app.

Triage signal: User reports of texts about deliveries, tolls or IT support, then sign-ins or MFA registrations from mobile carriers or new devices. SMS bypasses your mail gateway, so user reports are the main source.

Source: ATT&CK T1660 (Mobile)

Social Engineering

Manipulates people into performing actions or revealing information by exploiting trust, fear, urgency, or authority. Phishing, vishing and help-desk impersonation are all forms of it.

Triage signal: A request that uses urgency, authority or secrecy to skip a normal check: a password or MFA reset, a payment change, a remote session. Verify through a known channel, not the one the request came from.

Source: ATT&CK T1684Source: CISA

Spear Phishing

Targeted phishing customized for a specific individual or organization to increase success rate.

Triage signal: A message that cites real projects, colleagues or vendors and comes from a look-alike or newly registered domain. Search for other recipients: targeted campaigns rarely hit one person.

Source: ATT&CK T1566

Typosquatting

Registers look-alike domains (or package names in npm and PyPI) to trick users into visiting malicious sites or installing malicious code, often to harvest credentials or deliver malware.

Triage signal: DNS lookups or links to newly registered domains one character off from yours or your vendors’, and packages with names close to popular ones installed in builds.

Source: ATT&CK T1583.001

USB / Removable Media Infection

Malware spread on USB drives, usually as a disguised shortcut (LNK) or executable the user is tricked into opening. Autorun from removable media is disabled by default on modern Windows, but some organizations re-enable it via legacy Group Policy. Devices that pose as keyboards (BadUSB, Rubber Ducky) execute without user action and fall under Hardware Additions (T1200).

Triage signal: Removable-media events (6416, Partition Diagnostic 1006), LNK or EXE files executed from a removable drive, and a new keyboard device that types at machine speed.

Source: ATT&CK T1091Source: ATT&CK T1200

Valid Accounts

Logging in with real credentials that were stolen (often from infostealer logs), bought from an access broker, or left at defaults. Nothing is exploited, so the only signal is behavior: new device, new location, impossible travel, unusual hours or access. The Snowflake customer-account thefts were this, at scale.

Triage signal: A correct password used from a new device, location or ASN, at unusual hours, then access the user does not normally make. Check whether the credential appears in infostealer logs.

Source: ATT&CK T1078

Vishing (Voice Phishing)

Phone calls or voicemails impersonating authority figures or institutions to extract credentials or prompt unsafe actions.

Triage signal: A user report of a call from ‘IT’ or ‘the bank’, then a password reset, MFA change or remote-access install within minutes. Line up the call time with identity and endpoint logs.

Source: ATT&CK T1566.004

Whaling

Spear phishing targeting high-profile individuals like executives, often for financial fraud (business email compromise) or data theft.

Triage signal: Messages to executives or their assistants about payments, legal matters or board business from look-alike domains or compromised partner accounts. Verify payment-change requests out of band.

Source: ATT&CK T1566
🐟🐠🐡🐟click → credentials → compromise
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Phishing

Deceptive messages that lure users into clicking, opening, or entering credentials. The bait is the message (email, SMS, a QR code, a chat ping, a phone call); the line is the trust the sender impersonates; the catch is initial access. Modern kits proxy the real login page (adversary-in-the-middle), so the catch is often a live session cookie rather than a password, and MFA alone does not stop them.

industry-news.example+ implanted payload👤👤👤👤👤👤site every target readsarrive · drink · drive-by infection
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Watering Hole Attack

Do not go to the targets. Wait at the website they all visit (an industry news source, a community forum, a vendor portal), implant a payload there, and infect everyone who shows up. The name began as a metaphor; the technique is now mature espionage tradecraft, and criminal crews use it too, usually via fake browser-update prompts injected into the compromised site.

vendorcompromisedupdateupdateupdatecustomer Acustomer Bcustomer Cone breach upstream · thousands compromised downstream
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Supply Chain Compromise

The vendor ships the malware for you. A trusted update, package or integration flows through normal channels to thousands of customers. Espionage operators then often activate only a chosen few, so the distribution radius and the exploitation radius differ. SolarWinds, ShadowHammer, 3CX and M.E.Doc did it through signed vendor updates. XZ Utils did it through a hijacked open-source maintainer role, tj-actions through a CI dependency, and the 2025 Shai-Hulud worm through hundreds of npm packages. Different names, same shape.

leaked DB (sourced)alice@x:hunter2bob@y:dragonseve@z:starwars1jim@w:p@ssw0rdkim@v:summer22tia@u:Welcome!target sitechecks each pairtiny hit rateenough for ATO at scale
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Credential Stuffing

The attacker is not guessing. They have leaked credentials from somewhere else. They replay them at scale against your login page. Password reuse across sites is what makes the economics work: reuse is common enough that even a tiny per-attempt success rate pays off across millions of attempts. MFA stops most of it, ideally phishing-resistant MFA such as passkeys. Per-IP rate limits alone do not, because attackers spread attempts across residential proxies. Bot detection and screening passwords against breach corpora at signup and reset close more of the gap.

Execution and injection

Code execution, injection, and process manipulation techniques.

Vocabulary for: Alert · Uncover

ClickFix (fake CAPTCHA / paste-and-run)

A lure that tells the user to press Win+R (or open a terminal) and paste an attacker command, usually mshta or PowerShell, to “verify they are human” or “fix” an error; the user executes it themselves.

Triage signal: RunMRU registry entries and explorer.exe spawning powershell or mshta.

Source: ATT&CK T1204.004

Command and Scripting Interpreter

Using legitimate command-line shells or scripting environments to execute commands: PowerShell and cmd.exe on Windows, bash and zsh on Linux and macOS, Python, JavaScript, and AppleScript.

Triage signal: PowerShell script-block logs (4104) with encoded or downloaded content, cmd or bash launched by an unexpected parent (Office, a browser, a web server), and interpreters running from user download paths.

Source: ATT&CK T1059

Macro-based Execution

Malicious VBA (or legacy Excel 4.0/XLM) macros in Office files that run when the user enables content, or automatically from a Trusted Location. Since 2022, Office on Windows blocks macros by default in files carrying Mark of the Web (downloads and email attachments), so attackers moved to container files (ISO, LNK), HTML smuggling (T1027.006) and paste-and-run lures (T1204.004). When a macro alert fires today, ask how the file got past the block: user Unblock, missing MOTW, a Trusted Location, or a policy exception.

Triage signal: WINWORD.EXE or EXCEL.EXE spawning cmd, powershell, wscript, mshta or rundll32, and Office trust records showing content enabled on a downloaded file.

Source: ATT&CK T1059.005Source: ATT&CK T1204.002Source: Microsoft Learn

Process Doppelgänging

Overwriting a legitimate executable inside a Transactional NTFS (TxF) transaction, creating a process from the modified image, then rolling the transaction back, so the file on disk never changes.

Triage signal: Transactional NTFS APIs used by a process that is not an installer, and a process whose image on disk does not match its memory. Rare; most EDRs flag it as process tampering.

Source: ATT&CK T1055.013

Process Injection

Running code inside another live process’s memory (DLL injection, process hollowing, thread hijacking, and similar sub-techniques) so it inherits that process’s identity and trust. Sometimes loosely called memory injection, a phrase that can also mean fileless execution (see Fileless Malware).

Triage signal: A process writing to another process’s memory and starting execution there (Sysmon Event 8, CreateRemoteThread), or executable memory not backed by a file.

Source: ATT&CK T1055

Reflective DLL Injection

A DLL that maps itself into memory with its own loader instead of the Windows loader, so it never appears as a file on disk or in the normal loaded-module list. EDR catches it as executable memory not backed by any file (T1620; remote-process variants fall under T1055.001).

Triage signal: Memory scans or EDR alerts for unbacked executable memory containing a PE header, often in a process that just made a network connection. Capture memory before any reboot: the evidence lives nowhere else.

Source: ATT&CK T1620Source: ATT&CK T1055.001

Side-loading

Planting a malicious DLL next to a legitimate (often signed) program that loads a DLL of that name from its own folder, so trusted code runs the payload. Search-order hijacking is the sibling variant under the same ATT&CK ID, T1574.001 “DLL” (see DLL Search Order Hijacking).

Triage signal: A signed vendor EXE running from a user-writable path such as AppData or ProgramData alongside an unsigned DLL.

Source: ATT&CK T1574.001

Thread Execution Hijacking

Suspending an existing thread in another process, writing code into that process, pointing the thread’s context (instruction pointer) at it with SetThreadContext, and resuming it. Unlike CreateRemoteThread-style injection, no new thread is created.

Triage signal: EDR alerts on SuspendThread, SetThreadContext and ResumeThread against another process, with the thread’s instruction pointer in unbacked memory. No new thread appears, so CreateRemoteThread-based rules miss it.

Source: ATT&CK T1055.003

WMI Abuse

Using Windows Management Instrumentation to run commands and query system data on the local host or on remote hosts. Access is through PowerShell (Get-CimInstance, Invoke-CimMethod), COM/DCOM, or the deprecated wmic.exe (see the WMIC entry in the CLEAR glossary). WMI is native and looks like admin activity, so it blends in with legitimate management traffic. WMI event subscriptions used for persistence are a separate technique, T1546.003.

Triage signal: WmiPrvSE.exe spawning cmd or powershell, a network logon followed by a WmiPrvSE child process on the target, and wmic process call create in command lines.

Source: ATT&CK T1047
notepad.exe (suspended)payload.exeresumedlooks likenotepad
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Process Hollowing

A legitimate process is launched in a suspended state, its memory is replaced with malicious code, and execution resumes. To observers (and many EDR tools) the process still looks like the trusted binary: same name, same path, same parent. The shell stays the same while the contents are swapped. EDR catches it from the API sequence: a suspended launch, NtUnmapViewOfSection, cross-process writes, then SetThreadContext/ResumeThread.

target process (explorer.exe)kernel32.dlluser32.dllole32.dll+ evil.dllevil.dllruns with target’s privileges & trust
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DLL Injection

A malicious DLL is loaded into another process’s address space. The injected code now runs with the target’s privileges and trust, inherits its network handles, and survives in the loaded-modules list of a legitimate binary. EDR catches the injection moment; static tools see only a benign process.

trusted binaries used maliciouslypowershell.exe→ -enc base64…certutil.exe→ -urlcache evil.binrundll32.exe→ evil.dll,Startwmic.exe→ process call createmshta.exe→ http://evil/…bitsadmin.exe→ /transfer evil.datLOLBins: signed, trusted, present by default on Windows
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Living Off The Land

Why install attacker tooling when Windows already ships with everything you need? PowerShell, certutil, rundll32, mshta, bitsadmin: every one Microsoft-signed and present by default, so there is no attacker binary to hash or block by reputation. The payload may still land on disk (certutil and bitsadmin downloads do), but the tool doing the work is trusted. Some, such as mshta, are on Microsoft’s own recommended block list, which is why hardened environments restrict them. WMIC is the exception: Microsoft removed it from all supported Windows 11 versions in the August-September 2026 updates (no Feature on Demand reinstall), so wmic.exe running on a current Windows 11 host is itself anomalous. It still ships on older Windows Server releases. Attackers now reach WMI through PowerShell CIM cmdlets (Invoke-CimMethod, Get-CimInstance) instead.

vulnerable web appname = request.form[‘name’]return eval(“greet_” + name + ”()”)↑name = “admin() if 0 else import(‘os’).system(‘id’) #”# comments out the trailing ()↑ injected: the interpreter runs attacker code
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Code Injection

Input that becomes code. Whether it is SQL, JavaScript, shell, or Python eval, the pattern is the same: untrusted text concatenates with logic and the interpreter cannot tell where the data stops and the program begins. Benign input and malicious input travel the same path; the difference shows up only at runtime, in what the interpreter actually does with it. Here the payload admin() if 0 else import(‘os’).system(‘id’) # turns the evaluated string into a valid expression that runs a shell command, and the trailing # comments out the () the app appends. The fix is to never pass input to an interpreter: look the function up in an allowlist instead.

Credential access and abuse

Techniques used to obtain, abuse, or manipulate identity data, on premises and in the cloud identity provider.

Vocabulary for: Subject · Scope

Account Enumeration

Discovering valid usernames, either externally by probing authentication responses (Reconnaissance, T1589) or internally by listing domain/cloud accounts after access (Discovery, T1087).

Triage signal: External: many sign-in attempts returning ‘user does not exist’ (Entra error 50034, Windows 4625 with sub-status 0xC0000064) across many names. Internal: LDAP queries or net user /domain listings from a workstation.

Source: ATT&CK T1589Source: ATT&CK T1087

Account Takeover

Adversary gains unauthorized control of a user’s account using stolen credentials or session tokens to impersonate the user.

Triage signal: A sign-in from a new device, location or ASN, then changes the real user would not make: a new MFA method, a new inbox rule, a changed recovery address, or edited payment details. The changes, not the sign-in, confirm it.

AD CS Abuse

Abusing misconfigured Active Directory Certificate Services templates or enrollment endpoints (the ESC1 to ESC8 family) to obtain a certificate that authenticates as another user, often a domain admin. Certificates outlive password resets, so revoke them during remediation.

Triage signal: Certificate requests (4886) and issuances (4887) where the requester and the subject differ, especially for privileged accounts, and certificate-based Kerberos logons (4768 with certificate fields) from unexpected hosts.

Source: ATT&CK T1649

AiTM Phishing

Adversary-in-the-middle phishing: a kit proxies the real login page, so the victim completes their own password and MFA prompts while the proxy captures the resulting session cookie.

Triage signal: An interactive, MFA-satisfied sign-in from a hosting-provider IP right after a link click, followed by the same session used from a new device.

Source: ATT&CK T1557Source: ATT&CK T1539

AS-REP Roasting

Requesting Kerberos authentication data for accounts that have pre-authentication disabled, then cracking it offline to recover the password.

Triage signal: Event 4768 with pre-authentication type 0 for accounts that should not have it disabled.

Source: ATT&CK T1558.004

Compromised Credentials

Usernames and passwords exposed, stolen, or leaked, enabling attackers to gain unauthorized access to systems or services.

Triage signal: A credential that appears in infostealer logs, a breach corpus or a paste, or is used from infrastructure the user never used. A reset is not the end: revoke sessions and check what the credential already did.

Source: ATT&CK T1078

Credential Theft

Stealing login information (passwords, hashes, tokens, session cookies) through phishing, infostealers, keyloggers, memory dumping, or system exploitation. An umbrella term: Credential Dumping, Token Theft and AiTM Phishing on this page describe the specific methods.

Triage signal: Look for the use that follows the theft: a new sign-in, device or token shortly after the phishing click, malware run or memory read. The theft itself is often visible only on the endpoint where it happened.

Source: ATT&CK TA0006

DCSync

Impersonating a domain controller and asking a real one to replicate password data, which returns the hash of any account, krbtgt included. Requires replication rights, so it follows a domain-admin-level compromise.

Triage signal: Directory replication requests (4662 with the replication GUIDs) from a host that is not a domain controller.

Source: ATT&CK T1003.006

Device Code Phishing

Tricking a user into entering an attacker-generated device code on the real Microsoft or other IdP sign-in page, which hands the attacker tokens for the user’s account. No fake site and no password capture are involved. Used at scale by Storm-2372 from 2024. Blocking the device code flow where it is not needed is the main control.

Triage signal: Entra sign-in logs showing the device code authentication protocol for a user who does not use device-code apps, often right after a Teams or chat invite, then token use from a different IP.

Source: ATT&CK T1528

Device Registration

Registering an attacker-controlled device to a compromised account so access survives a password change: as a new MFA method (an authenticator app or phone number), or as a registered or joined device in the identity provider or MDM, which can satisfy device-based Conditional Access and, in Microsoft Entra ID, obtain a Primary Refresh Token. Storm-2372 and Scattered Spider have both used it. An ATT&CK Persistence technique.

Triage signal: Entra ID audit events such as “Register device”, “Add registered owner to device” or “User registered security info” soon after a risky sign-in, a help-desk reset or a device code sign-in, from an unfamiliar location, or with a device name outside your naming scheme. A password reset does not remove it: list the account’s devices and MFA methods and remove the ones nobody can account for. See Identity-persistence sweep.

Source: ATT&CK T1098.005

Diamond and Sapphire Tickets

Stealthier relatives of the golden ticket that start from a real TGT. A diamond ticket decrypts a legitimately issued TGT with the krbtgt key and edits its privilege data; a sapphire ticket goes further and embeds a real privileged user’s privilege data obtained through Kerberos delegation (S4U2self). Because a genuine ticket request happened, the usual ‘service ticket with no TGT’ check misses them.

Triage signal: Harder to spot than a golden ticket because a matching 4768 exists. Look for privilege data that does not match the account (groups it does not hold), encryption types that do not fit the account, and how the attacker got the krbtgt key: any DCSync or NTDS.dit theft means krbtgt is compromised.

Source: Unit 42 (2022)

Golden SAML

Forging SAML tokens with a stolen federation token-signing key, such as an AD FS token-signing certificate. The attacker can then sign in to any service that trusts the key, as any user and with any claims, without a password or MFA, and resetting user passwords does not stop it. CyberArk named the technique in 2017; APT29 used it in the SolarWinds campaign.

Triage signal: Sign-ins at a federated service with no matching token issuance at the identity provider (for AD FS, no audit event 1200 for that user and time), an export of the token-signing certificate or a read of the AD FS key container in Active Directory, and federation-trust changes on a domain in the cloud audit log. Rotating the signing key ends it, once the attacker’s access to the identity provider is removed. See Identity-persistence sweep.

Source: ATT&CK T1606.002

Kerberoasting

Requesting Kerberos service tickets for accounts with SPNs and cracking them offline to recover the service account’s password, which then enables privilege escalation, persistence or lateral movement. Since Microsoft’s CVE-2026-20833 hardening (enforced April 2026, rollback removed July 2026), domain controllers issue AES service tickets by default to accounts with no explicit msDS-SupportedEncryptionTypes, and AES tickets are far slower to crack. In event 4769, a Ticket Encryption Type of 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) is now a strong signal, and service accounts still explicitly configured for RC4 are the prime targets.

Triage signal: One account requesting service tickets (4769) for many SPNs in a short burst, especially with Ticket Encryption Type 0x17 (RC4). A honey SPN account that no one should ever request makes the call near-certain.

Source: ATT&CK T1558.003Source: Microsoft KB (2026)

MFA Fatigue

Flooding a user with push-notification approval requests, sometimes paired with a call pretending to be IT, until they accept one. Also called push bombing. Number matching and phishing-resistant MFA defeat it.

Triage signal: Several MFA push denials or timeouts for one user within minutes (Entra error 500121), then an approval, often with a sign-in from a new location. Ask the user whether they approved it.

Source: ATT&CK T1621

NTDS.dit Extraction

Copying the Active Directory database (ntds.dit) and the SYSTEM hive from a domain controller to extract every account’s hash offline.

Triage signal: Ntdsutil “ifm” or vssadmin shadow-copy commands on a domain controller, or ntds.dit appearing outside its normal path.

Source: ATT&CK T1003.003

NTLM Relay

Forwarding a victim’s NTLM handshake to another service (SMB, LDAP, MSSQL, or AD CS HTTP enrollment) to authenticate as the victim without knowing the password. Relaying to an SMB server is often called SMB relay. Usually paired with authentication coercion (PetitPotam, the printer bug) or LLMNR/NBT-NS poisoning. Blunted by SMB signing (required by default for inbound and outbound on Windows 11 24H2 Pro/Enterprise/Education, outbound only on Server 2025), LDAP signing and channel binding, Extended Protection for Authentication on AD CS, and Microsoft’s deprecation of NTLM (announced 2024; NTLMv1 removed in Windows 11 24H2 / Server 2025).

Triage signal: NTLM network logons (4624 type 3) for a user or machine account from an IP that is not their host, especially machine accounts authenticating to AD CS web enrollment or LDAP, and LLMNR or NBT-NS responses from an unexpected host.

Source: ATT&CK T1557.001Source: Microsoft SMB signing

Overpass-the-Hash (Pass-the-Key)

Using a stolen NT hash or Kerberos key to request a real Kerberos ticket, so the attacker continues with Kerberos instead of NTLM and blends in with normal domain authentication.

Triage signal: TGT requests (4768) with RC4 encryption (0x17) for an account that normally gets AES, from a host the user is not logged on to.

Source: ATT&CK T1550

Pass-the-Ticket

Stealing a Kerberos ticket (TGT or service ticket) from one session and injecting it into another to authenticate as that user without the password or hash. A stolen TGT can request tickets for any service the identity is entitled to; a stolen service ticket opens only the one service it was issued for.

Triage signal: A Kerberos ticket used from a host other than the one it was issued to (the client address in 4769 or 4624 does not match the 4768 that issued the TGT), and Rubeus or Mimikatz kerberos::ptt on the source host.

Source: ATT&CK T1550.003

Password Cracking

Using brute force, dictionary attacks, or rainbow tables to recover plaintext passwords from hashes.

Triage signal: Offline, so invisible in your logs. You see the inputs (hash theft, Kerberoasting) and the result (a valid logon with a recovered password). Weak or old service-account passwords are the usual victims.

Source: ATT&CK T1110.002

PRT Theft

Stealing an Entra ID Primary Refresh Token, the device-bound token Windows uses for single sign-on to Microsoft cloud services. A stolen PRT gives the attacker the user’s cloud sessions with MFA already satisfied. Token protection and hardware-backed keys make extraction harder.

Triage signal: Sign-ins with a PRT from a device ID or IP that does not match the registered device, browser-cookie or token tools on the endpoint, or a Defender alert for PRT access. Revoke sessions and review the device registration.

Source: ATT&CK T1528

Rainbow Table

Precomputed table of hash values used to reverse cryptographic hashes, recovering plaintext passwords more efficiently. Salting defeats it: a unique random value added to each password before hashing makes precomputed tables useless, so rainbow tables matter mainly against unsalted hashes such as Windows LM and NTLM.

Triage signal: Offline, so there are no logs. Its triage relevance is exposure: treat any stolen unsalted hash (NTLM, legacy LM, old web-application MD5) as a recoverable password.

Shadow Credentials

Writing an attacker-controlled key to a target account’s msDS-KeyCredentialLink attribute, then using it to request Kerberos tickets as that account.

Triage signal: Unexpected changes to msDS-KeyCredentialLink (event 5136).

Silver Ticket Attack

Similar to Golden Ticket but forges a Kerberos service ticket (TGS) with the target service account’s key, giving access to that one service. The forged ticket never touches a domain controller, which makes it quieter than a golden ticket.

Triage signal: Service access (4624 on the target) with no matching service-ticket request (4769) on any domain controller, because a forged service ticket never touches one; also RC4 tickets presented to services that only use AES.

Source: ATT&CK T1558.002

Token Impersonation

Duplicating another process’s existing Windows access token (for example with DuplicateTokenEx) and acting under it, the classic route from a service account holding SeImpersonatePrivilege to SYSTEM. Creating a fresh token from stolen credentials is the sibling technique T1134.003.

Triage signal: A service-account process (IIS, SQL Server) spawning a SYSTEM process, potato-family tools (JuicyPotato, PrintSpoofer, GodPotato) on disk or in command lines, or a SYSTEM shell under a web or database server parent.

Source: ATT&CK T1134.001

Token Manipulation

ATT&CK’s umbrella technique (T1134) for abusing Windows access tokens: impersonating or stealing another process’s token (T1134.001), creating a process with a stolen token (T1134.002), building a new token from stolen credentials (T1134.003), and spoofing a parent process (T1134.004). Token Impersonation and Parent PID Spoofing on this page are its common forms.

Triage signal: A process running as a different user from its parent with no logon event to explain it, EDR alerts on DuplicateTokenEx or CreateProcessWithTokenW, and 4624 logon type 9 (new credentials) on the host.

Source: ATT&CK T1134

Token Theft

Stealing an already-issued bearer credential that has passed MFA (browser session cookie, OAuth access or refresh token, Entra Primary Refresh Token, cloud CLI token) from browsers, disk caches, memory or an AiTM proxy, then replaying it from attacker infrastructure. Theft: T1539 Steal Web Session Cookie, T1528 Steal Application Access Token. Replay: T1550.004, T1550.001. Duplicating a Windows access token on an endpoint is the separate T1134.001 (see Token Impersonation).

Triage signal: The same session or refresh token used from a new IP or ASN with no new interactive sign-in, especially right after an infostealer or AiTM event. Revoke the sessions and tokens; a password reset alone does not end it.

Source: ATT&CK T1528Source: ATT&CK T1539
attacker👤👤👤👤👤Autumn2026!Autumn2026!Autumn2026!
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Password Spraying

One common password, many accounts. The inverse of brute force on a single account, designed to avoid lockouts and stay under detection thresholds. A seasonal candidate such as Autumn2026! tried once against every user in a directory will get a few hits and almost never trip a lockout. In identity-provider logs that looks like many accounts failing with the same error (bad password) in the same window, whether from one source or spread across many rotating IPs, often repeated at intervals over days.

attackerpassword123456qwertyletmeinadminWelcome1attempt #Ncycle every common passworduntil one works
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Brute Force

The opposite of password spraying: one account, many passwords. The attacker cycles through common candidates (password, 123456, qwerty, letmein) against a single account. Lockout policies and rate limits exist to defeat this; weak detection lets it grind silently for hours.

host Amemory dumpNTLM hash 31d6…host Bauth as victimno password ever cracked
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Pass-the-Hash

The attacker never needs the plaintext password. The NTLM hash from host A authenticates against host B because the protocol treats the hash as the credential. Silent, valid until the password changes, and the backbone of many lateral-movement campaigns. Triage signal: a 4624 logon with LogonType 9 and the seclogo logon process on the source host, or NTLM network logons for one account fanning out across many hosts.

lsass.exealice:31d6cf…bob:a4f8c2…svc-bot:e9b1…admin:8c5fd…dba:f1a3b9…root:c2d8e4…attacker
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Credential Dumping

LSASS memory holds reusable credential material (NT hashes, Kerberos tickets, sometimes plaintext) for interactive, RDP, RunAs, service and scheduled-task logons; plain network logons leave none. Tools like Mimikatz read it directly. EDR flags unusual processes opening lsass.exe for memory read (Sysmon Event ID 10). On current Windows 11 Enterprise, Credential Guard (default on eligible 22H2+ devices) and LSA protection/RunAsPPL (default on new enterprise-joined 22H2+ installs) block the classic dump.

krbtgt hash(stolen)TGTforged · 10ydomainownedkrbtgt → forge TGT → impersonate anyone
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Golden Ticket Attack

With the krbtgt account hash, an attacker forges a Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket that authenticates as anyone, for as long as they want. The fix is rotating the krbtgt password twice, but only after the attacker’s access is removed (otherwise they simply re-harvest the new key) and with at least the maximum ticket lifetime (10 hours by default) plus full replication between the two resets. Done properly the procedure is routine; that it is so rarely done is why Golden Tickets make such durable persistence.

👤usercookie: SID=…attackerserverwelcome, usercookie replayed · no re-auth required
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Session Hijack

The session cookie is the credential after login. Steal it through an AiTM phishing proxy, an infostealer, XSS or a network MITM, then replay it elsewhere: unless the session is bound to the device, the server sees a valid, already-MFA’d session. No password prompt, no MFA. Same session ID, different person. (Detection has to come from context: a new IP, ASN or device fingerprint on a session that never re-authenticated.)

Stealth and defense impairment

ATT&CK v19 (April 2026) splits the old Defense Evasion tactic in two. Stealth (TA0005) is hiding in plain sight; Defense Impairment (TA0112) is breaking the defenders’ tools and telemetry. Each card below names the tactic it belongs to.

Vocabulary for: Alert · Uncover

Binary Obfuscation

Code is deliberately scrambled, encrypted, or disguised to make analysis harder and evade static analysis engines.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: File analysis showing high entropy, few readable strings and few imports, or a sample that only unpacks in memory. Obfuscation raises suspicion; behavior decides the verdict.

Source: ATT&CK T1027

Binary Padding

Adds non-functional data or junk code to malware files to change their hash, inflate them past scanner size limits, and avoid signature-based detection.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Files far larger than their content needs, often over 100 MB, with long runs of null or junk bytes at the end. Many scanners skip large files, which is the point.

Source: ATT&CK T1027.001

Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver (BYOVD)

Loading a legitimately signed but vulnerable kernel driver, then exploiting it to kill EDR processes or disable kernel protections from ring 0. The most common EDR-killer technique in 2025-2026 ransomware. Microsoft’s vulnerable driver blocklist prevents many known drivers.

Tactic: Defense Impairment (TA0112)

Triage signal: A new kernel driver service created (event 7045) or driver loaded (Sysmon event 6) shortly before security agents stop reporting.

Source: ATT&CK T1685Source: ATT&CK T1068

Clear Windows Event Logs

Wiping Windows event logs (wevtutil cl, Clear-EventLog) to destroy evidence. T1685.005 in ATT&CK v19; previously T1070.001. Event 1102 (Security log cleared) and 104 (System log cleared) are themselves high-signal alerts.

Tactic: Defense Impairment (TA0112)

Triage signal: Security event 1102 or System event 104, wevtutil cl or Clear-EventLog in command lines, and gaps in forwarded logs. Clearing is rarely routine on a server, and your SIEM copy may still hold what was erased.

Source: ATT&CK T1685.005

Command-Line Obfuscation

Malicious commands hidden using encoding (Base64), string concatenation, or misleading syntax to bypass command-line monitoring.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Command lines with -enc or -EncodedCommand, caret and escape characters, string concatenation or environment-variable substrings. Decode before judging: PowerShell script-block logging (4104) records the decoded script.

Source: ATT&CK T1027.010

Debugger Evasion

Malware checks whether a debugger is attached (IsDebuggerPresent, timing checks) and changes behavior or exits so analysts cannot step through it.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Mostly a sandbox and reverse-engineering concern. A sample that behaves differently under analysis than in the field is evidence of evasion, not innocence.

Source: ATT&CK T1622

Delayed Execution

Malware deliberately waits (sleep calls, scheduled tasks, ping loops, API hammering) before acting, so automated sandboxes time out before they see malicious behaviour. ATT&CK T1678 Delay Execution; also called time-based evasion. Waiting for user input such as mouse clicks or a document closing is a separate check, T1497.002 User Activity Based Checks.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Long sleeps, ping -n loops or timeout commands before the payload, and scheduled tasks set to run hours later. When a sandbox report is clean, check how long the sandbox ran.

Source: ATT&CK T1678

Disable or Modify Tools

Stopping, uninstalling, or crippling security tools: killing EDR processes (often with EDR killers such as AvNeutralizer or through BYOVD), tampering with AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) or ETW (Event Tracing for Windows), adding Defender exclusions, or stopping log forwarders. Replaced T1562 Impair Defenses in ATT&CK v19. Pre-ransomware EDR killing is among the highest-signal events an analyst can catch; a host that suddenly stops reporting is a finding, not a gap.

Tactic: Defense Impairment (TA0112)

Triage signal: Defender event 5007 (configuration change) adding exclusions, EDR or log-forwarder services stopped, AMSI or ETW patching flagged by EDR, and agents that go silent. Check the agent’s health before trusting its silence.

Source: ATT&CK T1685

Email Hiding Rules (Inbox Rules)

Mailbox rules an attacker creates in a compromised account to move, mark as read or delete the messages the owner should not see: security alerts, replies from a payment contact, anything containing words such as “invoice”, “wire” or “hacked”. Common in business email compromise. A forwarding rule that copies mail to an outside address is the collection side of the same trick (T1114.003). Both live in the mailbox and survive a password reset.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: New-InboxRule, Set-InboxRule or UpdateInboxRules in the Microsoft 365 unified audit log, especially a rule that deletes mail or moves it to RSS Feeds, Archive or Conversation History, matches finance or security keywords, has a one-character name, or was created in the same session as a risky sign-in. Export the rules as evidence before they are removed; a password reset alone leaves them running.

Source: ATT&CK T1564.008

Encoded Payloads

Payloads encoded or encrypted (Base64, XOR) to hide true content until runtime, evading static detection.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Long Base64 or hex strings in scripts, command lines or registry values, and processes decoding them (certutil -decode, FromBase64String).

Source: ATT&CK T1027.013

Exploitation for Defense Impairment

Exploiting a vulnerability in security software or the operating system to switch off or bypass a defense, for example a flaw in an EDR agent or a kernel bug that lets the attacker unload protections. BYOVD is the most common form, using a vulnerable third-party driver.

Tactic: Defense Impairment (TA0112)

Triage signal: A security product crashing or its service stopping just after an exploit-like event or a new driver load, or a known-vulnerable version of the security tool itself. Check the agent version against vendor advisories.

Source: ATT&CK T1687

File Extension Spoofing

Files disguised with misleading extensions (e.g., invoice.pdf.exe) to trick users and bypass basic file-type filters. It works because Windows File Explorer hides known file extensions by default. The Unicode right-to-left override character (U+202E, T1036.002) pulls off the same trick by visually reversing the end of the file name.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: File names with double extensions or the right-to-left override character (U+202E) in attachments or downloads, and an executable launched from a file whose name ends in a document type.

Source: ATT&CK T1036.007Source: ATT&CK T1036.002

HTML Smuggling

Building a malicious file inside the victim’s browser from JavaScript or encoded data in an HTML attachment or page, so email and web gateways only ever see HTML. LNK smuggling hides commands in shortcut files in a similar way (T1027.012).

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: An HTML attachment or page that builds a download in the browser (a Blob or data URI), then a ZIP, ISO or script in Downloads with no matching web download in the proxy logs.

Source: ATT&CK T1027.006

LOLBins

Living Off the Land Binaries: trusted, signed system executables (certutil, rundll32, mshta) weaponized so the malicious part is the argument line, not the file on disk. The evasion face of the Living Off The Land technique covered under Execution.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Signed system binaries with network or script arguments: certutil -urlcache, mshta with a URL, regsvr32 /i: with a URL (Squiblydoo), rundll32 with a DLL from a user path. The parent and the arguments are the evidence.

Source: LOLBAS project

Low-and-Slow

Performing actions gradually or in minimal increments (scheduled transfers, small data chunks, sparse logins) to remain under detection thresholds. Detection needs long look-back windows rather than per-hour thresholds.

Tactic: Exfiltration (TA0010)

Triage signal: Small, regular transfers or logins that never trip per-hour thresholds but add up over weeks. Use long look-back queries and per-entity totals.

Source: ATT&CK T1029Source: ATT&CK T1030

MAC Address Spoofing

Changing a network interface’s hardware (MAC) address to impersonate an allowed device and slip past network access control (NAC) or MAC filtering. Note that phones and laptops now randomize Wi-Fi MACs by default, so a changing MAC is usually privacy behavior, not an attack.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005); no dedicated ATT&CK technique

Triage signal: One MAC appearing on two switch ports, a known device’s MAC on a new port or with a new OS fingerprint, or NAC logs showing an allowed MAC failing posture checks.

Mark-of-the-Web Bypass

Delivering files in containers or formats that do not carry the Mark-of-the-Web zone tag (ISO, VHD, some archives) so SmartScreen and Office’s macro block never apply. A file from the internet that lacks MOTW is worth asking about.

Tactic: Defense Impairment (TA0112)

Triage signal: ISO, VHD, IMG or archive files mounted or opened from email or downloads, and executables or LNK files run from the mounted drive with no Zone.Identifier stream.

Source: ATT&CK T1553.005

Masquerading

Disguising a malicious process, file or task as a trusted one (sometimes called process masquerading): svchost.exe running from C:\Users\Public, or a scheduled task named like a Windows one. Check the path, signer and parent, not the name. Matching a legitimate name or location (T1036.005) is the most common form.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: A system binary name running from the wrong path (svchost.exe outside System32), a parent that does not fit (svchost not started by services.exe), or a signer that does not match the name.

Source: ATT&CK T1036Source: ATT&CK T1036.005

Parent PID Spoofing

Spawns processes that appear to be launched by trusted executables (like explorer.exe), misleading analysts and EDR that rely on the process tree.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: A process whose reported parent could not have created it (explorer.exe as the parent of a SYSTEM process), or EDR showing a creator process that differs from the PPID. The ParentImage field alone can be fooled.

Source: ATT&CK T1134.004

Right-to-Left Override (RLO)

The Unicode control character U+202E, which displays the text after it in reverse. A file actually named invoice, then U+202E, then fdp.exe displays as “invoiceexe.pdf”, so an executable passes for a PDF. A Masquerading technique; see also File Extension Spoofing.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: Search file, attachment and process-creation logs for the U+202E character itself, not for the displayed name, and treat any file name that contains it as suspect. An executable whose displayed name ends in a document extension is the same tell. Some tools render the character as garbled bytes; see Telemetry labs.

Source: ATT&CK T1036.002

Safe Mode Boot

Rebooting a host into Safe Mode, where most security agents do not load, before running ransomware or other payloads (bcdedit /set safeboot).

Tactic: Defense Impairment (TA0112)

Triage signal: bcdedit /set safeboot in a command line, a service added under the SafeBoot registry keys, and a reboot shortly after. Security agents go quiet during that reboot.

Source: ATT&CK T1688

Subdomain Abuse

Using subdomains that genuinely belong to trusted services, so attacker traffic inherits the parent domain’s reputation: an attacker’s own app or bucket on a shared cloud platform (anyone can create an Azure web app, and its hostname sits under azurewebsites.net), or the takeover of one of your DNS records that still points at a deprovisioned cloud resource.

Tactic: Resource Development (TA0042)

Triage signal: Links or connections to tenant-style subdomains on trusted platforms (azurewebsites.net, cloudfront.net, pages.dev) your business does not use, and your own DNS records pointing at deprovisioned cloud resources.

Source: ATT&CK T1584.001

System Binary Proxy Execution (formerly Signed Binary Proxy Execution)

ATT&CK’s umbrella technique (T1218) for running malicious code through trusted system binaries such as rundll32, regsvr32, mshta and msiexec, so execution looks like normal OS activity. See LOLBins.

Tactic: Stealth (TA0005)

Triage signal: rundll32, regsvr32, mshta or msiexec loading a script or DLL from a URL or user-writable path, especially with an Office app, browser or script host as the parent.

Source: ATT&CK T1218

User-Agent Spoofing

Alters HTTP headers to mimic trusted applications or browsers, blending into normal web traffic. A browser user agent coming from a process that is not a browser is the tell.

Tactic: Command and Control (TA0011)

Triage signal: Proxy logs where the user-agent string does not match the process making the request (from EDR network events), outdated or rare browser versions, or one host presenting many agents in a short window.

Source: ATT&CK T1071.001

0x4a3b9e2c

0xdeadbeef

0x9f1c5d22

0xc0ffee01

↑ signature changes; behavior stays the samebehavior:read keysexfil HTTPS
FEATURED

Polymorphic Malware

Each copy re-encrypts or mutates itself: different hashes, different bytes, identical behavior. Signature-based detection sees four “different” samples; behavior-based detection sees one campaign. The hash on the left cycles while the behavior box on the right stays static. This is why TTP-based hunting outperforms IOC matching, and why even commodity malware now defeats hash blocklists.

malware boots, runs environment checks✓ disk size > 60 GB?✓ uptime > 20 min?✓ user moved mouse?✗ VMware Tools found→ sandbox detected · exit clean
FEATURED

Sandbox / Environment Detection

Most sandboxes are not very lived-in. They have small disks, brief uptime, no mouse activity, suspicious driver names, and known artifacts. Malware that runs checks like these (disk size, uptime, mouse movement, VM drivers) will sit silent in analysis, then unfurl on a real user’s host. A sample that is silent in the sandbox but active on the endpoint is evidence of evasion, not innocence.

implant.dll metadatacreated: 2024-11-04 09:13created: 2009-07-13 17:14modified: 2024-11-04 09:14modified: 2009-07-13 17:14accessed: 2024-11-04 09:14accessed: 2009-07-13 17:14timestamps overwritten · file looks ancient
FEATURED

Timestomping

Attackers rewrite the MACB timestamps (modified, accessed, entry changed, born/created) on dropped files to a date that matches everything around them. A binary that “shipped with Windows” in 2009 will not catch the eye of an analyst scanning recent-changes lists. Same bytes, different forensic story. The tell: most tools rewrite only the $STANDARD_INFORMATION timestamps, so a $FILE_NAME creation time later than $SI, sub-second fields of exactly zero, or a USN (Update Sequence Number) journal entry dated this week all expose the lie.

Command and control infrastructure

Mechanisms adversaries use to communicate with and control compromised systems, and the infrastructure tricks that keep those channels alive.

Vocabulary for: Uncover

Bulletproof Hosting (BPH)

Hosting services known for ignoring abuse complaints and allowing malicious activities to operate with minimal risk of takedown. Traffic to a known BPH network is a strong risk multiplier during triage. CISA and partners published dedicated mitigation guidance in November 2025.

Triage signal: Connections to ASNs or IP ranges flagged as bulletproof hosting in threat intelligence, especially from servers. Weigh the process: a browser visiting is different from a service beaconing.

Source: CISA (2025)

C2 Framework

A commercial or open-source toolkit that provides implants, listeners and operator consoles for hands-on-keyboard intrusions: Cobalt Strike, Sliver, Havoc, Mythic, Brute Ratel C4. Malleable profiles let operators reshape traffic to imitate legitimate services, so detection keys on implant behavior and beacon shape rather than fixed signatures.

Triage signal: Implant behaviors rather than names: default or odd named pipes, sacrificial processes (rundll32 or dllhost with no arguments), in-memory loaders, and regular beacons. One confirmed running implant means an operator whose access no control has contained: the escalation tripwire fires, and the case escalates as hands-on-keyboard activity.

Source: ATT&CK T1071

Command and Control (C2)

The channel an attacker uses to send commands to compromised systems and receive results or stolen data (ATT&CK tactic TA0011). It usually hides in common protocols or trusted cloud services, so rhythm and destination give it away, not the port.

Triage signal: A host repeatedly talking to a destination it has no business with, on a rhythm. Confirmed C2 that no control has blocked means an attacker can act on that host now: the escalation tripwire fires.

Source: ATT&CK TA0011

Custom Encryption Protocols

Non-standard encryption schemes that wrap malicious traffic to avoid detection by DPI or SSL/TLS inspection.

Triage signal: High-entropy payloads on ports or protocols that should be plain text or standard TLS, with no recognizable TLS handshake. JA4 or JA3 fingerprints that match no known client help.

Source: ATT&CK T1573

Custom Protocols over Non-Standard Ports

Known protocols on ports they are not normally paired with (HTTPS on 8088, SSH on 443), or fully custom protocols (a home-grown binary C2 protocol over raw TCP), chosen to slip past detection that expects known service behavior.

Triage signal: A protocol and port mismatch in network metadata (TLS on 8088, SSH on 443, an unknown binary protocol on 80), especially from servers. Zeek or firewall application identification usually flags it.

Source: ATT&CK T1571Source: ATT&CK T1095

Dead Drop Resolver (DDR)

Malware fetches a pointer, usually an encoded domain or IP, from content posted on a legitimate service (Pastebin, GitHub, a social-media profile) and then connects to the real C2 server it points to. The legitimate site hides the C2 address from static analysis and lets the operator rotate infrastructure. Pivot on whatever the host connects to next. If the commands themselves are read from the web service, that is T1102.002 (bidirectional) or T1102.003 (one-way).

Triage signal: A non-browser process fetching a specific Pastebin, GitHub or social-media page, then connecting to a new IP or domain within seconds.

Source: ATT&CK T1102.001

Dynamic Resolution / Fallback Channels

Ways an implant finds its C2 when the primary address is blocked: computed domains (DGA), rotating DNS answers (fast flux), or a built-in list of backup domains and protocols it falls back to (sometimes called callback domain rotation). Blocklisting one address rarely ends the session; hunt for the next destination the host tries.

Triage signal: After a block, the same host trying new domains or IPs within minutes on the same cadence and from the same process. Pivot on the process and the timing, not the indicator.

Source: ATT&CK T1568Source: ATT&CK T1008

Email-based C2

Using SMTP/IMAP or a cloud mail API to send or receive commands and data, hidden in attachments or content that blends with business traffic.

Triage signal: A non-mail process connecting to SMTP, IMAP or a mail API, or a mailbox whose drafts or folders change on a schedule with no user activity. Mailbox audit and Graph API logs carry it.

Source: ATT&CK T1071.003

ICMP Tunneling

Embedding commands or data in ICMP echo packets (ping) to establish covert C2 communication that traditional firewalls often miss.

Triage signal: ICMP echo packets with large or varying payloads, steady pings to one external host, or ICMP volume far above baseline from one machine.

Source: ATT&CK T1095

ORB Network

Operational relay box network: compromised or leased routers, IoT devices and VPS nodes chained into a proxy mesh that nation-state actors route through (Volt Typhoon’s KV botnet is one example). Traffic arrives from residential or small-business IPs near the victim, which defeats IP reputation and geolocation checks.

Triage signal: Activity from residential or small-business IPs near you that change often, against VPN or edge devices. IP reputation will look clean, so pivot on the account, the device and the behavior.

Source: ATT&CK T1090

Peer-to-Peer (P2P) C2

Mesh-like networks where infected systems communicate with each other to share commands and updates without a centralized server, so taking down one node does not cut the botnet off.

Triage signal: Internal hosts talking to each other on unusual high ports, or many internal hosts reaching many external consumer IPs with no central destination.

Source: ATT&CK T1090

Protocol Tunneling

Encapsulates malicious traffic within legitimate protocols (HTTPS, DNS, ICMP) to bypass network detection.

Triage signal: One protocol carrying traffic it should not: SSH inside HTTPS, RDP over an SSH tunnel (plink, chisel), or a tunneling tool binary on a server. Find the tool, then the session.

Source: ATT&CK T1572

Residential Proxies

Commercial or criminal proxy services that route attacker traffic through home internet connections, so sign-ins and sprays appear to come from ordinary consumer ISPs. A reason “one source” detections fail and per-IP rate limits barely slow attackers.

Triage signal: Sign-ins from consumer ISPs in unexpected regions that change between attempts while the user agent or device fingerprint stays the same. Detect on the account and the fingerprint, not the IP.

Source: ATT&CK T1090.002

Slack-based C2

Abuse of Slack’s APIs, webhooks, or tokens to create covert C2 by embedding commands or exfiltrated data within messages or bots. The same pattern runs over Discord, Microsoft Graph/OneDrive, Google Sheets/Drive and Dropbox; pivot on which process is talking to the API, not on the destination.

Triage signal: A process other than the Slack client calling Slack API or webhook endpoints, or a bot token used from an unexpected host.

Source: ATT&CK T1102.002

Social Media C2

Using X (formerly Twitter), Facebook or Instagram posts, images or profiles on trusted domains to carry encoded commands or retrieve data.

Triage signal: A non-browser process fetching social-media profile or post URLs on a schedule, followed by new outbound connections or commands.

Source: ATT&CK T1102

Telegram Bots

Leveraging Telegram’s bot API to issue commands or receive data, creating C2 over an encrypted, trusted messaging platform.

Triage signal: Connections to api.telegram.org from processes that are not the Telegram client, especially from servers or scripts. Infostealers and RATs use it to send stolen data.

Source: ATT&CK T1102.002

Tor-based C2

Leveraging Tor to anonymize attacker and malware communication, making attribution and traffic analysis significantly harder.

Triage signal: Connections to known Tor relays or Tor ports (9001, 9030, or 9050 locally), tor.exe or a renamed copy on a host. Tor from a server is suspicious in most organizations.

Source: ATT&CK T1090.003

Tunneling Services

Legitimate reverse-tunnel services (ngrok, Cloudflare Tunnel, Microsoft dev tunnels) that expose an internal host or relay C2 through a trusted vendor domain. The domain is reputable, so pivot on which process opened the tunnel and whether the organization uses the service.

Triage signal: ngrok, cloudflared or devtunnel binaries on hosts that do not use them, DNS lookups for those services’ domains, and a long-lived outbound session from a server. Ask who started the tunnel.

Source: ATT&CK T1572
hostC2every 60s
FEATURED

Beaconing

Periodic check-in from an infected host to its C2 server. The cadence is the signature: regular intervals (60s, 5m, 1h) with consistent packet sizes betray a beacon even when the destination and protocol look legitimate. Modern implants add jitter (randomizing the sleep around a base interval), so hunters look for tight statistical distributions rather than exact periodicity. Legitimate software beacons too (updaters, telemetry and EDR agents), so baseline before you escalate.

hostDNSattacker NSaGVsbG8.dGhpcw.attacker.example↑ data encoded in subdomainDNS looks normal to the firewallbut carries C2 and exfil data
FEATURED

DNS Tunneling

The data is in the subdomain. aGVsbG8.dGhpcw.attacker.example looks like a DNS query to your firewall, but the labels are base64-encoded chunks of command-and-control traffic. Because DNS is rarely blocked or deep-inspected, the channel hides in plain sight. Long, high-entropy subdomains to the same parent zone are the canonical detection signal. Encrypted DNS (DNS over HTTPS) that bypasses the corporate resolver removes that visibility, so unsanctioned DoH from an endpoint is itself worth a look.

bad.exampleTTL: 60s203.0.113.7198.51.100.42192.0.2.99203.0.113.88198.51.100.5192.0.2.31
FEATURED

Fast Flux DNS

One domain. Six (or sixty, or six hundred) IPs rotating beneath it on short TTLs, usually compromised machines acting as proxies. Block one IP and the next resolution returns another. Defenders trying to take down the infrastructure cannot pin it long enough for a block to stick. The stable pivot is the domain itself (and its name servers, when they rotate too in double flux): block or sinkhole the domain, and treat the IPs as disposable, possibly victim-owned, hosts.

generated daily, only one is livexj4kq9z2.testm7bf3vl8.examplec2pq8whe.invalidtx9k4rmn.testf3hp7vlq.examplea1c8bd0r.invalidattacker registers 1 of N each daymalware tries all; only 1 resolvestoday’s live C2:c2pq8whe.invalidstatic block lists can’t keep up
FEATURED

Domain Generation Algorithm

Instead of a hardcoded C2 domain, the malware computes a fresh list each day (or hour) from a seed. The attacker registers just one of the generated names. The malware tries them all; only the registered one resolves. Static blocklists lag behind because the candidate names change continuously. Researchers who reverse-engineer a DGA can predict and pre-block future names (registries locked every Conficker A domain this way in 2009), but per-victim seeds and thousands of candidates a day make that hard to repeat. The more reliable signal is the search itself: bursts of NXDOMAIN (no such domain) responses for random-looking names. Wordlist DGAs that string real words together are harder to spot by entropy alone.

FEATURED

HTTPS C2

The beacon hides in normal-looking HTTPS traffic: 200 OK, encrypted body, a plausible hostname. At a glance it blends in with its neighbors. What gives it away is shape, not content: regular timing, near-constant byte counts, a young or rarely visited domain, a user agent that does not match the host’s browser. TLS inspection and JA4 fingerprinting add more signal (JA3 is degraded against modern browsers).

SNI / DNS: cdn.bigcloud.example (looks legit)↑ what the firewall seesHost: attacker-c2.evil.example↑ where traffic actually goesouter name allowed · inner Host routes anywhere
FEATURED

Domain Fronting

The SNI (and DNS lookup) point at a trusted content delivery network (CDN), so the firewall sees only the allowed front. Inside the encrypted request, the Host: header redirects to attacker infrastructure on the same CDN. That mismatch between outer and inner names is where the technique lives, and why most major CDNs eventually shut the door on it. Encrypted Client Hello (ECH) now hides the inner name legitimately, so the outer-versus-inner comparison only works where TLS is inspected.

Data theft and exfiltration

How data leaves: attacker exfiltration techniques, plus the accidental exposures that trigger the same regulatory clocks. “Breach” is a legal word: whether an event is a reportable breach is decided by privacy or legal counsel, not the analyst, so describe what happened and escalate (see Scope > Regulatory).

Vocabulary for: Scope · Risk

Attacker techniques

Archive Collected Data

Compressing and often password-protecting collected files (7-Zip, WinRAR, tar) before exfiltration, which shrinks transfers and hides content from inspection.

Triage signal: 7z.exe, rar.exe or tar run with a password switch (-p, -hp) against shares or user folders, producing large archives in Temp, ProgramData or a share root.

Source: ATT&CK T1560

Data Harvesting

Automated or bulk collection of data via scrapers, malware, or scripts, often used for profiling, fraud, or resale.

Triage signal: High request rates from one client or rotating proxies walking through IDs or pages in order, unusual API pagination, and accounts that read far more records than they work on.

Data Staging

Collected data consolidated in one place before exfiltration (a local directory, a file share, or a cloud instance), often compressed and encrypted into archives (T1560). Staging reduces the number of outbound connections. A multi-gigabyte .7z or .rar appearing in ProgramData, %TEMP% or a share root is one of the best pre-exfiltration detection opportunities. Splitting transfers to stay under thresholds is a separate technique (T1030).

Triage signal: Large archives or copied file sets appearing in Temp, ProgramData, the recycle bin or a share root, created by a server process or remote session shortly before outbound transfers.

Source: ATT&CK T1074

Data-Theft Extortion

Stealing data and demanding payment to keep it off a leak site, with no encryption at all (Cl0p’s file-transfer campaigns are the defining example). There may be no ransomware alert, so the exfiltration itself is the incident.

Triage signal: Exploitation of an internet-facing file-transfer or data platform, then bulk downloads, then an extortion email to executives. The platform’s own logs show which files left.

Encrypted Web Uploads

Data uploaded over HTTPS to cloud storage or attacker-controlled servers, so content inspection sees only encrypted traffic. Volume, destination age and the uploading process are the signals.

Triage signal: Bytes out far larger than bytes in to a single new destination, from a process that does not normally upload, often outside working hours.

Source: ATT&CK T1048.002Source: ATT&CK T1567

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Sending stolen data out over the same channel the implant already uses for commands, so there is no new destination to spot; the signal is a change in upload volume on an existing beacon.

Triage signal: An existing beacon’s upload size jumps, or its interval changes during a data copy. Compare bytes out before and after the staging activity.

Source: ATT&CK T1041

Exfiltration to Cloud Storage

Bulk upload or sync of stolen data to a cloud storage service (MEGA, Dropbox, a cloud bucket) with tools such as rclone.

Triage signal: Rclone.exe or a renamed copy on a server, its config file, or sustained outbound volume to a storage provider the host never used before.

Source: ATT&CK T1567.002

Insider Data Theft

Unauthorized removal of sensitive data by someone with legitimate access: an employee, contractor, or a fraudulent remote hire such as a DPRK IT worker. Signals are behavioral (unusual volume, new destinations, off-hours access), not malware.

Triage signal: Observable technical activity only: bulk downloads or repository clones, uploads to personal storage, USB writes (event 6416 plus DLP), or printing far outside the person’s baseline. HR-held context reaches the case only through the insider-risk route.

Interception in Transit (Adversary-in-the-Middle)

Capturing or altering data as it crosses a network, by sniffing unencrypted protocols, ARP or LLMNR poisoning, or proxying a TLS session (as AiTM phishing kits do to steal session cookies).

Triage signal: ARP, LLMNR or NBT-NS responses from an unexpected host, clients presented with untrusted certificates, and sign-ins from a phishing proxy’s IP right after the user’s own.

Source: ATT&CK T1557

Transfer Data to Cloud Account

Moving data to another cloud account the attacker controls inside the same provider (sharing a snapshot or bucket cross-account), so no data crosses the network perimeter. Only cloud audit logs show it.

Triage signal: Cloud audit events that share a snapshot, image, disk or bucket with an external account ID, such as ModifySnapshotAttribute or a bucket policy granting another account in AWS CloudTrail.

Source: ATT&CK T1537

Exposure conditions

Data Breach

A security incident that results in unauthorized access to, or accidental or unlawful loss, alteration, destruction or disclosure of, protected data. Whether an event is legally a breach (and starts a notification clock) is for privacy or legal counsel to decide, not the analyst. Scale is irrelevant, and accidental disclosures can qualify. See Scope > Regulatory.

Triage signal: Not an analyst call. Your job is the facts: what data, how many records, whose, whether it was accessed or taken, and when you became aware of it. Record the time of awareness, because legal clocks may run from it.

Source: GDPR Art. 4(12)

Data Exposure

Data left accessible without proper controls, often due to misconfigurations like open cloud storage, unsecured APIs, or an application revealing internal details or user data. Information disclosure is the matching vulnerability class (CWE-200): a system reveals internal details, metadata or user data to someone not entitled to it. Exposure is a condition, not proof of access: check the access logs before you call it theft.

Triage signal: A public bucket, open share, unauthenticated API or verbose error found by a scan or report. Pull the access logs for the whole exposure window before deciding whether anyone took anything.

Source: CWE-200

Data Leak

Informal term for data exposed outside its intended boundary, often accidentally (misdirected email, public bucket). An accidental leak of personal data or protected health information (PHI) can still be a reportable breach, so escalate it the same way. Not the same as extortion leak sites, where stolen data is published deliberately. See Scope > Regulatory.

Triage signal: A misdirected email, public link or open bucket reported by a user or scanner. Capture who could reach the data, for how long, and whether access logs show anyone did.

Shadow Data

Sensitive or regulated data stored in unmanaged, forgotten, or unsanctioned locations: abandoned cloud buckets, rogue spreadsheets, old backups, and prompts or files pasted into unsanctioned AI tools.

Triage signal: Data discovery or DSPM tools finding regulated data in unmanaged locations, and uploads of sensitive files to unsanctioned SaaS or AI tools in CASB or proxy logs.

Third-Party Data Exposure

Compromise or exposure of sensitive data caused by a breach, misconfiguration, or negligence on the part of an external vendor or partner. Your own logs may show nothing, yet the data is still yours, and so is the notification decision.

Triage signal: Vendor breach notices, threat-intelligence reports or leak-site listings naming a supplier, and unusual activity by that vendor’s integrations or accounts in your tenant (OAuth apps, API keys, support access).

Unstructured Data Exposure

Leakage of documents, logs, screenshots, or audio: content that is harder to classify or monitor with traditional DLP tools.

Triage signal: DLP alerts on documents, screenshots or recordings leaving through chat, email or upload, and bulk access to file shares or meeting recordings by one account.

corporate perimeter📄 PII.csv📄 prod.db📄 keys.json📄 source.zipattackercloud dropleaking…
FEATURED

Data Exfiltration

The deliberate, unauthorized transfer of data out of the network. Files leave through whatever channel the attacker can use: bulk sync to cloud storage with tools such as rclone or MEGA, uploads over the existing C2 channel, a DNS tunnel, or a slow drip below the DLP threshold. Watch for both shapes: a large, sustained outbound volume (often bandwidth-throttled) to a storage provider the host never talks to, and small repeating transfers in a direction the network was not expecting.

Exploited vulnerabilities

Real-world CVEs and architectural flaws that adversaries used at scale, or that reshaped defense. For what is being exploited right now, check CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog.

Vocabulary for: Uncover · Risk

BlueKeep (CVE-2019-0708)

Critical RDP vulnerability allowing remote code execution without authentication on older Windows versions. “Wormable”: it could in principle self-propagate like WannaCry, though no worm ever appeared (in-the-wild use from late 2019 was human-operated coin mining). Microsoft fixed it in the May 2019 Patch Tuesday and took the rare step of also patching out-of-support XP and Server 2003. Highlighted the danger of exposing RDP directly to the internet.

Triage signal: Inbound RDP (3389) from the internet to unpatched Windows 7, Server 2008 or older hosts, termdd.sys crashes, and IDS hits for the MS_T120 channel request. Start with exposure: is any unpatched RDP reachable?

Source: NVD CVE-2019-0708

Citrix Bleed (CVE-2023-4966)

Memory over-read in Citrix NetScaler ADC and Gateway that leaks valid session tokens, letting attackers hijack already-authenticated sessions and skip passwords and MFA. Exploited as a zero-day from August 2023 and then by LockBit affiliates. Patching did not end the exposure: stolen sessions stayed valid until every session was killed.

Triage signal: Oversized requests to the appliance’s OpenID configuration endpoint, then one session ID used from several IPs. Patching is not enough: every active session has to be killed, as the advisory required.

Source: CISA AA23-325A

Dirty COW (CVE-2016-5195)

Linux kernel privilege escalation via a race condition in the copy-on-write handling of memory mappings. An unprivileged process with read access to a file can race the COW path to write the underlying page, modifying files it should only be able to read, including system binaries owned by root. Discovered after an in-the-wild exploit was captured against a Linux server; later weaponized by Android malware (ZNIU) to root devices. Impacted a wide range of distributions and Android.

Triage signal: An unprivileged local process gaining root on an old Linux kernel, often with modified setuid binaries or /etc/passwd. Mostly relevant now on embedded and legacy Linux, so check kernel versions.

Source: NVD CVE-2016-5195

EternalBlue

NSA SMBv1 exploit leaked by Shadow Brokers in 2017. Buffer overflow allows unauthenticated remote code execution. It was instrumental in WannaCry and NotPetya, and spurred deprecation of SMBv1 and stronger patching practices.

Triage signal: SMBv1 traffic, especially one host reaching many on port 445, IDS signatures for the exploit, and SYSTEM-level processes appearing on the target with no logon. SMBv1 still enabled anywhere is a Scope finding.

Source: NVD CVE-2017-0144

Follina (CVE-2022-30190)

Vulnerability in the Microsoft Support Diagnostic Tool (MSDT) triggered via crafted Word documents. Executes code through the ms-msdt protocol handler without macros when the document is opened; the RTF variant fires from the Explorer preview pane with no click at all. Stealthier than VBA-based attacks, it was used in phishing campaigns before it was fully addressed; MSDT itself is now deprecated.

Triage signal: msdt.exe launched by an Office process with ms-msdt or PCWDiagnostic on the command line, followed by sdiagnhost.exe spawning a shell.

Source: NVD CVE-2022-30190

Ivanti Connect Secure (CVE-2023-46805 / CVE-2024-21887)

An authentication bypass chained with a command injection in Ivanti’s VPN appliance, exploited as zero-days by a China-nexus actor from December 2023 and then at scale in January 2024, prompting a CISA emergency directive. A defining case of edge-device exploitation that leaves little or no endpoint telemetry, and of attackers persisting through appliance upgrades.

Triage signal: Appliance logs and the vendor’s integrity checker, not endpoint telemetry: unexpected files on the appliance, web shell paths, and internal connections from the appliance that it would not normally make. Reset credentials that passed through it.

Source: CISA ED 24-01

PAN-OS GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400)

Unauthenticated command injection (CVSS 10.0) in the GlobalProtect feature of Palo Alto Networks firewalls, exploited as a zero-day in April 2024 to run code as root on the firewall itself. Another reminder that the security appliance at the edge is itself attack surface.

Triage signal: Unusual entries in the firewall’s GlobalProtect and telemetry logs, unexpected files or cron jobs on the device, and outbound connections from the firewall itself. Run the vendor’s checks: endpoint tools cannot see inside the appliance.

Source: NVD CVE-2024-3400

ProxyLogon

The March 2021 Exchange Server zero-day chain (CVE-2021-26855 server-side request forgery, chained with CVE-2021-26857, -26858 and -27065) first used by HAFNIUM and then mass-exploited by many groups to plant web shells. ProxyShell, a separate chain, followed in August 2021.

Triage signal: Exchange application pools (w3wp.exe) spawning cmd or powershell, new .aspx files in Exchange web directories, and unusual requests to /ecp/ or /owa/auth/. Web shells from 2021 may still sit on servers that were patched without being checked.

Source: NVD CVE-2021-26855

ProxyShell

Three chained Exchange vulnerabilities (CVE-2021-34473, -34523, -31207) allowing unauthenticated SYSTEM-level RCE through AutoDiscover and PowerShell endpoint abuse. Mass exploitation followed the August 2021 Black Hat talk, with attackers dropping web shells and staging ransomware. Not the same as ProxyLogon, the March 2021 zero-day chain.

Triage signal: Requests to /autodiscover/autodiscover.json carrying /mapi/nspi or /powershell, New-MailboxExportRequest writing .aspx files, and new web shells in Exchange directories.

Source: NVD CVE-2021-34473

Shellshock (CVE-2014-6271)

GNU Bash flaw allowing arbitrary command execution via environment variables. Especially dangerous through CGI scripts. It affected web servers, routers and IoT devices, exploits appeared within hours of disclosure, and it drove a broad review of UNIX-based software.

Triage signal: Request headers (User-Agent, Referer, Cookie) carrying a Bash function definition, the pattern that starts with ’() ’, aimed at CGI scripts or appliances, then the web server spawning bash, curl or wget.

Source: NVD CVE-2014-6271

Spectre / Meltdown

Hardware vulnerabilities in modern processors. Spectre (CVE-2017-5753, CVE-2017-5715) affects virtually all modern speculative CPUs (Intel, AMD, Arm); Meltdown (CVE-2017-5754) chiefly Intel, plus some Arm and IBM POWER cores (not AMD). Both exploit speculative execution to leak memory across trust boundaries. No confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, but the firmware, OS and cloud-hypervisor mitigations reshaped how hardware trust boundaries are viewed.

Triage signal: No practical triage signal: exploitation would happen in memory and leave little trace. The work is exposure management: microcode, OS and hypervisor patches on shared hosts.

Source: meltdownattack.com

Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472)

Netlogon protocol flaw. Netlogon used AES-CFB8 with a fixed all-zero IV, so about one in 256 all-zero authentication attempts succeeds. An unauthenticated attacker on the network can impersonate a domain controller, reset its machine-account password to empty, and then dump domain hashes (DCSync). Actively exploited soon after disclosure.

Triage signal: Netlogon events 5827 to 5829 (vulnerable Netlogon connections), a domain controller’s machine-account password changed by ANONYMOUS LOGON (4742), then replication requests from a host that is not a domain controller.

Source: NVD CVE-2020-1472
OpenSSLheartbeatattackercookie:Bz9q…key:----BEG..user:admin
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Heartbleed (CVE-2014-0160)

OpenSSL heartbeat extension flaw that lets a remote attacker read up to 64KB of memory per request (private keys, passwords, session tokens, anything in the server’s heap). The attack leaves no obvious log traces, which is why the post-disclosure cleanup required mass key rotation across the internet.

user input$${jndi:ldap://...}Log4jresolves JNDIattacker LDAPserves payloadRCEcode executesstep 1 → step 2 → step 3 → step 4
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Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228)

One line of user input becomes remote code execution. The JNDI lookup inside ${jndi:ldap://...} tricks Log4j into contacting attacker-controlled infrastructure, which returns a payload that the JVM then executes. Four steps in sequence: an attacker submits a string, Log4j resolves it, LDAP serves a malicious class, the JVM runs it. (On patched JVMs, exploitation used deserialization gadget chains instead, and even failed attempts leaked secrets through ${env:...} DNS lookups.)

Malware types

Categories of malware defined by technique, payload style, and evasion characteristics.

Vocabulary for: Alert · Uncover

Adware

Malware that displays unwanted advertisements, often bundled with legitimate software. Advanced adware can harvest data or serve as a delivery mechanism for more serious malware.

Triage signal: Browser extensions or bundled installers the user did not knowingly choose, scheduled tasks that relaunch them, and ad or redirect traffic. On its own it usually scores low impact; re-score if it downloads further payloads or harvests data.

Backdoors

Malicious code that provides unauthorized access to a compromised system, bypassing normal authentication. Often installed post-exploitation to maintain persistent remote control.

Triage signal: A listening port or outbound connection from a process with no business reason, a new service or account with no change record, or a modified authentication module (sshd, PAM, an IIS module). A confirmed backdoor means the host is compromised.

Banker Trojans

Malware designed to steal banking credentials and financial information by intercepting login sessions, injecting fake forms, or logging keystrokes. Often targets online banking and payment systems.

Triage signal: Browser processes with injected code, certificates or proxy settings added to the browser, and bank fraud alerts that line up with the host’s sign-in times.

Bootkits

Malware that tampers with the boot chain so it runs before the OS loads. On legacy BIOS systems that means the MBR/VBR; on UEFI systems it means boot files in the EFI System Partition (ATT&CK T1542.003). BlackLotus (2023) was the first publicly known UEFI bootkit to bypass Secure Boot on fully updated Windows 11. Firmware implants (e.g., MoonBounce, CosmicStrand) go further and live in SPI flash, where they survive disk wipes and replacement, so remediation may require reflashing firmware, not just reimaging.

Triage signal: Changes in the EFI System Partition or boot configuration, Secure Boot reported as off, or a measured-boot or boot-integrity alert. Reimaging the OS volume alone may not remove it; the boot partition and firmware need checking too.

Source: ATT&CK T1542.003Source: ESET (2023)

Click Fraud Malware

Malware that simulates user clicks on advertisements to generate fraudulent revenue. Often run on compromised systems in large volumes to exploit pay-per-click ad platforms.

Triage signal: Hidden or headless browser instances generating ad traffic, and high volumes of requests to ad networks from servers or idle hosts.

Crypters / Packers

Tooling that uses encryption or obfuscation to hide malicious code and evade antivirus. Not malicious on their own but commonly paired with trojans, RATs, or ransomware.

Triage signal: High entropy, unusual or missing section names (UPX0), and a tiny import table in a file analysis report. Legitimate software is packed too, so packing raises suspicion but does not settle the verdict.

Cryptojacker

Malware that mines cryptocurrency on someone else’s compute: hijacked servers, cloud instances created with stolen keys, or containers. The signal is sustained high CPU or GPU, connections to mining pools, and unexpected cloud spend.

Triage signal: CPU or GPU pinned near 100 percent on a server or container, connections to mining-pool ports (3333, 4444, 5555) or stratum URLs, xmrig or a renamed copy, and new compute instances in regions the organization does not use.

Source: ATT&CK T1496.001

Double Extortion

Encrypting a victim’s systems and stealing data, then threatening to publish it on a leak site if the ransom is not paid. Popularized by Maze in late 2019 and now standard; some crews skip encryption entirely (data-theft-only extortion). Restoring from backup does not end the incident, because the stolen data is still out there.

Triage signal: Large outbound transfers or rclone-style sync in the days before encryption, and archives staged on servers. When encryption hits, assume theft too until the exfiltration evidence says otherwise.

Source: ATT&CK T1486

Droppers and Loaders

A dropper carries its payload inside itself; a downloader/loader fetches it from the network. Both exist to get a follow-on payload (stealer, C2 implant, ransomware) running, and in practice the terms are often used interchangeably. Notable families: Emotet, ZLoader, SmokeLoader, IcedID, Bumblebee, Latrodectus, HijackLoader, GootLoader, SocGholish. Europol’s Operation Endgame (May 2024 onward, with further phases through 2026) has repeatedly disrupted this ecosystem, but operators tend to rebuild or move to new families.

Triage signal: A user-run file (script, MSI, LNK, ISO contents) followed within seconds by a new process from AppData or Temp, a scheduled task, and periodic outbound connections. Loader alerts come early: catch one and you head off what it was sent to fetch.

Source: Operation Endgame

Fileless Malware

Malware that runs from memory, keeping little or nothing on disk (payloads often hide in the registry or WMI), which makes it harder for file-scanning AV to detect. Often leverages legitimate system tools like PowerShell or WMI for execution.

Triage signal: Encoded PowerShell command lines, scripts stored in registry values, WMI subscriptions, and script-block logs (PowerShell event 4104) showing decoded content. The evidence lives in memory, so preserve it before any reboot.

Infostealers

Software that harvests sensitive data from victims: passwords, session cookies, browser history, autofill, crypto wallets. The resulting logs are sold in bulk and are a leading source of the valid credentials and session tokens used for initial access.

Triage signal: A cracked installer or fake update run by the user, then bulk reads of browser credential and cookie stores, then an upload to one new destination. Every credential and session on that device is exposed: passwords reset, sessions revoked, MFA methods reviewed.

IoT Malware

Designed to infect Internet of Things devices like routers, cameras, smart appliances. Often used in botnets (e.g., Mirai) due to weak authentication and outdated firmware.

Triage signal: IoT devices making outbound connections to rare destinations, scanning telnet or SSH internally, or sending sudden traffic bursts. These devices seldom keep logs; network flow data is the evidence.

Keylogger

Malware or a malware module that records keystrokes, usually to capture passwords and messages. Often bundled into RATs, infostealers and banker trojans.

Triage signal: A process installing a low-level keyboard hook (SetWindowsHookEx with WH_KEYBOARD_LL) or polling GetAsyncKeyState, and small periodic uploads or log files appearing in user folders.

Source: ATT&CK T1056.001

Logic Bombs

Malicious code triggered by specific conditions, such as a date or user action. Can remain dormant until activated, then execute destructive or stealthy functions.

Triage signal: Scheduled tasks, cron jobs or code paths keyed to a date or to an account being disabled, usually planted by someone with administrative rights. Review recent privileged changes to scripts and jobs when an administrator’s access is removed.

Mobile Malware

Malware targeting mobile devices, often distributed via malicious apps or phishing links. Includes SMS stealers, fake banking apps, mobile RATs.

Triage signal: MDM or mobile threat defense alerts for sideloaded apps, apps requesting accessibility or SMS permissions, or a configuration profile installed outside MDM. Corporate sessions from that device are suspect until it is cleaned.

Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS)

A business model in which developers rent their ransomware, leak site and negotiation services to affiliates who carry out the intrusions, splitting each ransom. Explains why the same ransomware brand shows very different tradecraft from one victim to the next: the affiliate, not the brand, did the intrusion.

Triage signal: Do not scope from the brand’s profile alone. The affiliate’s own tradecraft (entry vector, tools, exfiltration method) is what you will find on your hosts, so let the evidence drive scope.

Remote Access Trojan (RAT)

Malware that gives an operator interactive remote control of a host (keylogging, screen capture, file transfer, webcam). It is often delivered as a trojan the user runs, but loaders, exploits and hands-on-keyboard operators install RATs too. Attackers also commonly skip custom RATs and abuse legitimate remote-access/RMM tools (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Quick Assist, NetSupport), which are signed and often allowlisted: ATT&CK T1219 (Remote Access Tools), sub-technique T1219.002. See RMM Tool Abuse.

Triage signal: A persistent process holding a long-lived outbound connection, screen or webcam capture in use, and an operator issuing commands at human timing. Check for legitimate RMM tools installed alongside it.

Source: ATT&CK T1219

RMM Tool Abuse

Using legitimate remote monitoring and management or remote-access software (AnyDesk, ScreenConnect, Quick Assist, TeamViewer, NetSupport) as the attacker’s remote-control channel. The binaries are signed and often allowlisted, so the signal is context: an RMM tool the organization does not use, installed by a user after a help-desk call or a phishing lure, or run as a portable executable from a user folder.

Triage signal: An RMM installer arriving after a phone call or help-desk contact, a remote session the IT team cannot account for, or an agent enrolled to an account or tenant that is not the organization’s.

Source: ATT&CK T1219.002Source: CISA AA23-025ASource: Microsoft (2024)

Rootkits

Malware that hides its presence by subverting the OS or using kernel-level access. Often combined with other malware to maintain stealth and persistence.

Triage signal: Disagreement between views: a process, file, driver or connection visible in a memory image or offline scan but not from the live OS. The live host is not a reliable witness, so memory and offline analysis decide it.

Source: NIST glossary

Scareware

Software that tricks users into believing their device is infected, pressuring them to buy fake antivirus tools. Often a social-engineering precursor to real malware.

Triage signal: Browser pop-ups or notifications claiming infection, with a phone number or download link. Check whether the user called the number or installed anything, which turns it into a remote-access case.

Spyware

Malware that secretly monitors user activity: keystrokes, screen captures, camera or microphone access. Used for surveillance, espionage, or credential theft.

Triage signal: Unexpected processes using the camera, microphone or screen-capture APIs, and small regular uploads. On phones, MDM or mobile threat defense alerts on profiles or exploits.

Source: NIST glossary

Virus

Malware that infects other files or programs and spreads when they are run. Rare in modern intrusions compared with worms and trojans, but the word is still used loosely for any malware.

Triage signal: Many executables on a host or share changing at once with the same appended code, so their hashes change together. Rare today; most ‘virus’ alerts are other malware types, so read the detection details.

Source: NIST glossary

Web Shell

A script planted on a web server that gives the attacker remote command execution through ordinary HTTP requests; the standard foothold after edge-device and file-transfer exploitation (HAFNIUM, ProxyShell, MOVEit, SharePoint ToolShell).

Triage signal: The web server process (w3wp.exe, httpd, java) spawning a shell such as cmd.exe, powershell or /bin/sh.

Source: ATT&CK T1505.003

Worm

Self-propagating malware that spreads host to host without user action, usually through a network-reachable vulnerability (‘wormable’ describes such a flaw, e.g. EternalBlue, BlueKeep).

Triage signal: One host scanning many others on the same port (SMB 445, RDP 3389), then the same malware appearing on them. Spread is measured in minutes, so escalate immediately and let IR choose the containment.

Source: NIST glossary
0x4a3b0xdead0xbeef0x9f1c
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Ransomware

Malware that encrypts a victim’s files or systems and demands payment (usually in cryptocurrency) for the decryption key. Modern ransomware operators add data theft and public-leak extortion. In telemetry, the encryption sweep shows as rapid sequential file writes across the filesystem. Earlier tells include shadow-copy deletion (vssadmin, wmic, bcdedit) and backup-service kills. Watch for modern variants that encrypt VMs from the ESXi host, where endpoint agents see nothing, or encrypt only parts of each file to evade write-rate detection.

C2
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Botnet

Many infected machines (bots) taking orders from a controller, either a central C2 server or peer-to-peer relays between bots. The rhythm of regular check-ins is what defenders look for. DDoS, credential stuffing, spam, and proxy abuse all ride on this primitive. Modern botnets span PCs, servers, routers, and IoT.

📄 documents.xlsx📄 contracts.docx📄 source.zip📄 customers.db📄 backups.tar↑ irreversibly overwritten
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Wiper Malware

The destructive cousin of ransomware. There is no decryption key, no negotiation, no way to buy the data back: the wiper overwrites disk structures so the drive cannot be restored, and only offline backups help. NotPetya and WhisperGate wore the ransom-note costume while destroying the underlying data. Shamoon did not bother pretending: early variants overwrote files and disk structures with an image, and later ones used random data.

Malware families

Named tools and campaign malware tied to specific actors or operations. Status lines were last reviewed in October 2026; takedowns degrade these operations rather than end them, so check current reporting before you rely on one.

Vocabulary for: Uncover

BlackCat / ALPHV

Sophisticated ransomware-as-a-service operation, one of the first to use Rust, making detection and analysis harder. Highly customizable Windows / Linux payloads, double extortion with leak-site shaming. Successor to BlackMatter in the DarkSide lineage; ties to REvil are affiliate overlap, not direct succession. Defunct: the FBI disrupted ALPHV in December 2023, and in March 2024 the operators exit-scammed their affiliates after Change Healthcare’s reported $22M ransom payment, posting a fake law-enforcement seizure notice. Its affiliates moved to other RaaS programs.

Status (Oct 2026): Defunct since March 2024 (exit scam).

Triage signal: Historical brand; its affiliates moved on. A BlackCat-branded note today more likely means a copycat or a reused builder, so scope by the tradecraft on your hosts.

Source: CISA AA23-353ASource: KrebsOnSecurity (2024)

Cobalt Strike

Commercial adversary-simulation framework (sold by Fortra) whose cracked copies were heavily abused by APTs, ransomware gangs and commodity malware: Beacon C2, fileless injection, lateral movement, credential harvesting. Historically delivered by loaders such as TrickBot and BazarLoader (both retired around 2022). Fortra reports an 80% drop in unauthorized copies after a 2023 court order won with Microsoft and Health-ISAC and the June 2024 Operation Morpheus takedown of 593 servers, and actors increasingly use alternatives such as Sliver. Beacon’s sleep/jitter check-in pattern is still the reference beaconing signature.

Status (Oct 2026): Still seen, but cracked-copy abuse sharply reduced since 2024.

Triage signal: Default named pipes (MSSE-number-server, postex_), rundll32 or dllhost running with no command line yet making network connections, and a beacon cadence with jitter. A Beacon detection means hands-on-keyboard: treat it as an active intruder.

Source: ATT&CK S0154Source: The Record (2025)

Conti

One of the most prolific ransomware groups before disbanding in 2022. It ran a centralized structure, a professional affiliate model, and human-operated intrusions, using Cobalt Strike and TrickBot for movement. Internal chat-log leaks in 2022 exposed its structure, operations, and finances. Many former members moved to BlackCat or Royal; Royal later rebranded as BlackSuit, whose infrastructure law enforcement seized in July 2025.

Status (Oct 2026): Defunct since 2022; successor brands also disrupted.

Triage signal: Historical. Its playbook (Cobalt Strike, AdFind, rclone, vssadmin) lives on in successor crews, so the tradecraft still matters even when the name does not.

Source: ATT&CK S0575

Dridex

Banking Trojan evolved into a modular platform for credential theft, lateral movement, and ransomware delivery. Historically spread via Office macro attachments, a vector Microsoft sharply reduced by blocking internet-sourced macros by default from 2022. Injects into browsers to harvest banking credentials. Used to deploy Locky and BitPaymer. Associated with Evil Corp, which has relied on it less since about 2020 as it moved to its own ransomware and then LockBit; treat a new Dridex sighting as notable rather than routine.

Status (Oct 2026): Unclear; activity low since 2023, no public takedown.

Triage signal: An Office or script host starting a DLL through rundll32 or regsvr32 from a user folder, then injected explorer.exe making HTTPS connections. Rare now; read a Dridex detection as a loader alert that may precede ransomware.

Source: ATT&CK S0384Source: Mandiant (2022)

Emotet

Banking trojan turned modular loader botnet; for years the dominant initial-access delivery vehicle, dropping TrickBot, QakBot, and ultimately ransomware. Spread via thread-hijacked phishing with macro documents. Taken down by law enforcement in January 2021, resurfaced later that year, and was targeted again by Operation Endgame in May 2024. Its playbook still defines the loader-botnet ecosystem.

Status (Oct 2026): Disrupted (2021, again May 2024); sporadic since.

Triage signal: An email that replies in a real past thread with a new attachment or link, then a DLL launched by rundll32 or regsvr32 from a random-named folder in AppData. Infected hosts send mail outbound, so check SMTP egress too.

Source: ATT&CK S0367

EmPyre / Empire

Open-source post-exploitation framework with a Python server: PowerShell agents for Windows and Python agents for Linux/macOS (EmPyre, the former Python project, was merged into Empire 2.0). The original project was discontinued and its repository archived in January 2020; BC Security maintains the active fork, which adds C#, IronPython and Go agents. Originally a red-team tool, adopted by various actors. Encrypted C2, evasion techniques, in-memory execution. Less common in the wild than Cobalt Strike, but its presence in a compromise should be treated as a high-risk indicator.

Status (Oct 2026): Maintained by BC Security; original project archived 2020.

Triage signal: PowerShell with a long Base64 launcher, a stager calling out on a fixed cadence, and the default Empire HTTP paths (/admin/get.php, /news.php, /login/process.php) in untuned deployments.

Source: ATT&CK S0363

IcedID (BokBot)

Banking Trojan turned loader that dropped Cobalt Strike and ransomware, spread through malicious documents and phishing. Modular: credential theft, web injection, lateral movement, with persistence via scheduled tasks and registry keys. Was a key initial-access loader for ransomware crews. Latrodectus, likely written by the same developers, took over much of its role from late 2023, and Operation Endgame (May 2024) targeted IcedID’s infrastructure.

Status (Oct 2026): Disrupted May 2024 (Operation Endgame); largely replaced by Latrodectus.

Triage signal: A script- or ISO-delivered DLL run by rundll32, a scheduled task for persistence, and the main module downloaded as a fake GZIP file. Mostly historical; Latrodectus fills the same role.

Source: ATT&CK S0483Source: Europol (2024)

Lumma Stealer

The dominant malware-as-a-service infostealer of the mid-2020s, inheriting RedLine’s and Raccoon’s market. Harvests browser credentials, cookies, session tokens, and crypto wallets; the resulting logs are sold in bulk and seed downstream intrusions, including the 2024 Snowflake customer breaches. Distributed via malvertising, cracked software, and fake-CAPTCHA ClickFix lures. A May 2025 action led by Microsoft and the U.S. DOJ took down or blocked about 2,300 Lumma domains, though operators attempted to rebuild.

Status (Oct 2026): Disrupted May 2025; operators have attempted to rebuild.

Triage signal: A user who pasted a ClickFix command or ran a cracked installer, then browser credential and cookie stores read by a non-browser process, then an upload. Treat every credential and session on that device as exposed.

Source: CISA AA25-141BSource: Microsoft (2025)Source: U.S. DOJ (2025)Source: Mandiant UNC5537

Maze

Pioneered double extortion (encrypting systems and stealing data, then threatening to leak it) in late 2019, running a RaaS model with a public leak blog. It exploited RDP, phishing, and known vulnerabilities, and used Cobalt Strike and Mimikatz internally. Announced retirement in late 2020, but affiliates continued under the Egregor banner (the code-sharing Sekhmet family had operated in parallel).

Status (Oct 2026): Retired late 2020.

Triage signal: Historical; its double-extortion model is now standard. Encryption plus a leak-site threat means scoping the exfiltration from the first hour.

Source: ATT&CK S0449

Mimikatz

The canonical credential-theft tool: reads LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) memory to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets, and implements pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, golden and silver tickets. Written by Benjamin Delpy as a proof of concept; now embedded in nearly every intrusion toolchain and re-implemented inside countless loaders and C2 frameworks. EDR watches lsass access patterns specifically because of it, and Credential Guard and LSA protection, now default-on for many Windows 11 configurations, block its classic LSASS read.

Status (Oct 2026): Active open-source tool, still maintained and widely reimplemented.

Triage signal: lsass.exe opened by a non-system process (Sysmon event 10), command lines with sekurlsa::, lsadump:: or kerberos::, and Defender or AMSI hits on renamed builds. A Mimikatz alert means the credentials cached on that host are exposed: scope which accounts had logged on there.

Source: ATT&CK S0002

Qakbot (Qbot)

Multifunctional banking Trojan and malware dropper that evolved into a full-featured loader, spread through email-thread hijacking, with persistence, network discovery, credential harvesting, and encrypted C2. A cornerstone of many enterprise compromises. A U.S.-led multinational operation in August 2023 redirected the botnet to FBI-controlled servers and pushed an uninstaller to more than 700,000 infected computers. Its operators kept working (DOJ says they were still deploying ransomware in January 2025), and in May 2025 the U.S. indicted the alleged leader, Rustam Gallyamov, as part of Operation Endgame.

Status (Oct 2026): Disrupted August 2023; leader indicted May 2025.

Triage signal: Thread-hijacked email, a script or an ISO, OneNote or HTML attachment, a DLL run by rundll32 or regsvr32, then injected processes running network discovery. Mostly historical since the 2023 takedown; similar chains now deliver other loaders.

Source: ATT&CK S0650Source: U.S. DOJ (2025)

RedLine

Infostealer sold on underground forums. Harvests credentials, browser data, cryptocurrency wallets, and system information. Distributed via cracked software, malvertising, phishing, and fake installers. SOAP-based C2 (a .NET WCF service) over HTTP/S. Customizable and affordable; popular among low-skill actors and initial-access brokers. Infrastructure seized in the international Operation Magnus takedown (October 2024).

Status (Oct 2026): Disrupted October 2024 (Operation Magnus).

Triage signal: A cracked-software or fake-installer download, a .NET process reading browser stores, and outbound traffic to a SOAP endpoint on a non-standard port. Treat every credential and session on that device as exposed.

Source: MalpediaSource: ATT&CK S1240

Ryuk

High-impact ransomware operated by Wizard Spider, typically delivered via TrickBot or BazarLoader. It used AES/RSA file encryption against hospitals, municipalities and critical infrastructure, encrypted fast, and killed backup and recovery processes. Its operators are believed to overlap heavily with the subsequent Conti operation, generally treated as the successor brand.

Status (Oct 2026): Superseded by Conti (2021); inactive.

Triage signal: Historical. The Ryuk-era chain (TrickBot or BazarLoader, Cobalt Strike, then mass deployment through PsExec or Group Policy) is still the template for human-operated ransomware: the encryption comes last.

Source: ATT&CK S0446

Shamoon

Destructive wiper associated with Iranian state-sponsored actors. Infamous for the 2012 attack on Saudi Aramco that wiped roughly 30,000 machines; returned in 2016-2017 (“Shamoon 2”) against other Saudi organizations, including the General Authority of Civil Aviation. It overwrites the MBR with provocative imagery and renders devices inoperable, spreading via stolen credentials and admin shares. Its goal is destruction, not financial gain.

Status (Oct 2026): Historical (waves in 2012, 2016-2017 and 2018).

Triage signal: Historical, but the pattern recurs: reused credentials reaching many hosts over admin shares, then a wipe scheduled for one moment, often a weekend or holiday. Raw-disk driver loads and MBR writes are the last warning.

Source: ATT&CK S0140

TrickBot

Began as a banking Trojan and evolved into a modular enterprise-scale framework for credential theft, recon, and ransomware delivery. It often arrived via Emotet and then provided the foothold for Ryuk or Conti, with decentralized infrastructure, encrypted comms, and plugins for SMB spread and AD enumeration. A coordinated takedown in October 2020 only dented it; the operators wound the botnet down by 2022 as work shifted into Conti.

Status (Oct 2026): Inactive since 2022.

Triage signal: Historical. Its successors still follow its chain: loader, Active Directory enumeration, then Cobalt Strike and ransomware within days.

Source: ATT&CK S0266

Vidar

Widely distributed infostealer harvesting credentials, browser data, cookies, cryptocurrency wallets, and more. Delivered via phishing, malvertising and fake installers, with HTTP POST C2 and encrypted exfiltration. Customizable and available as malware-as-a-service; often bundled with or mistaken for RedLine / Raccoon. Vidar 2.0 (October 2025) was a ground-up rewrite.

Status (Oct 2026): Active (Vidar 2.0, October 2025).

Triage signal: A fake installer or malvertised download, a non-browser process reading browser and wallet stores, and C2 addresses fetched from a social-media or gaming profile (a dead drop resolver). Treat every credential and session on that device as exposed.

Source: Malpedia

WhisperGate

Destructive malware deployed against Ukraine in January 2022. It masquerades as ransomware but irreversibly corrupts the MBR and deletes system files in two stages: first it corrupts the bootloader, then it drops a wiper. There is no recovery mechanism: the goal was disruption, not profit. Attributed by Microsoft to Cadet Blizzard; in 2024 the U.S. indicted officers of GRU Unit 29155 for the operation (see CISA AA24-249A). Echoed NotPetya tactics.

Status (Oct 2026): Historical (2022).

Triage signal: Historical. The lesson stands: a ransom note with no working payment path and an overwritten MBR is a wiper. Escalate it as destructive activity, not extortion.

Source: ATT&CK S0689Source: CISA AA24-249A

Threat actor profiles

Named groups and individuals known for malicious cyber activity. Their tradecraft, motivations, and historical campaigns shape modern triage.

One group, many names: every vendor names actors from its own telemetry, so the same cluster carries a Mandiant APT number (APT29), a CrowdStrike animal (Cozy Bear), a Microsoft weather family (Midnight Blizzard), and a Proofpoint TA number. Under each card, a chip gives the actor’s motivation (nation-state or financially motivated) and attributed country, followed by the main vendor names, including Google Threat Intelligence’s 2026 cryptonyms where they exist. Microsoft publishes its full mapping on its threat actor naming page and as a JSON feed. Treat each name as one vendor’s view of overlapping activity, not a precise identity. Actor status changes fast; these cards were last reviewed in October 2026.

Vocabulary for: Uncover

Akira VPNs without MFA

Ransomware operation active since March 2023 that hits small and mid-sized organizations across most sectors. CISA’s advisory, updated in November 2025, lists its usual ways in: VPNs without MFA, and exploitation of Cisco ASA and FTD (CVE-2020-3259, CVE-2023-20269), SonicWall (CVE-2024-40766) and Veeam backup servers (CVE-2023-27532, CVE-2024-40711). It encrypts Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi hosts, added Nutanix AHV in 2025, and practices double extortion.

Triage signal: A VPN sign-in without MFA from an unfamiliar address, often a hosting provider, may be the only early warning. Remote-access tools, credential theft from Veeam backup servers and access to ESXi hosts follow before encryption.

Financially motivated · RaaS ATT&CK: G1024 · CrowdStrike: Punk Spider · Microsoft: no actor name for the brand (affiliates tracked separately)

Source: CISA AA24-109A

APT10 Cloud Hopper

Chinese state-sponsored group associated with global IP theft. Its Cloud Hopper campaign targeted managed service providers (MSPs) to compromise downstream customers. It has focused on healthcare, defense, aerospace and technology, using RedLeaves, custom loaders, spear-phishing, credential theft, and cloud-service abuse aligned with China’s economic and military goals.

Triage signal: Historical as a name; the pattern it set is current. Activity that arrives through a managed service provider’s accounts or remote tools is not trusted activity: check whether the provider expected that session.

Nation-state · China Microsoft: Purple Typhoon · CrowdStrike: Stone Panda

Source: ATT&CK G0045

APT28 Fancy Bear / Forest Blizzard

Linked to Russia’s GRU and known for aggressive operations: credential harvesting, malware deployment, and destructive attacks against political and military targets. Tied to the 2016 DNC breach and many NATO-related campaigns. It uses zero-days and weaponized Office documents, and is noisier and more direct than APT29; a primary actor in Russian hybrid warfare.

Triage signal: Password spraying and credential phishing against webmail and VPN, exploitation of edge devices and of Outlook (CVE-2023-23397 leaked NTLM hashes through a calendar reminder), and outbound NTLM authentication to external hosts. Sign-ins relayed through compromised small-office routers are common.

Nation-state · Russia (GRU) Microsoft: Forest Blizzard · GTIG: LAKE RELIC · CrowdStrike: Fancy Bear

Source: ATT&CK G0007

APT29 Cozy Bear / Midnight Blizzard / UNC2452 / NOBELIUM

Sophisticated espionage group associated with Russia’s SVR, built for stealth and long-term access. It targets governments, think tanks, healthcare and vaccine researchers. It is the group behind the SolarWinds SUNBURST compromise (tracked by Mandiant as UNC2452 until it was merged into APT29 in April 2022). Custom malware, living-off-the-land and well-crafted spear-phishing let its operations go undetected for months. As Midnight Blizzard (Microsoft’s name), it breached Microsoft’s own corporate email in 2023-2024 by password-spraying a legacy test tenant.

Triage signal: Identity-plane tradecraft: password spraying from residential proxies against legacy or test tenants, OAuth applications granted broad mail access, device code and other token phishing, and malicious RDP files sent by email (October 2024). Look in identity and application audit logs, not only on endpoints.

Nation-state · Russia (SVR) Microsoft: Midnight Blizzard (formerly NOBELIUM) · GTIG: ICE RELIC · CrowdStrike: Cozy Bear

Source: ATT&CK G0016Source: Mandiant (2022)

APT33 Iran / aviation + energy

Iranian government-linked group targeting aerospace, energy, and critical infrastructure. It mixes espionage with destructive tooling: ATT&CK links it to the StoneDrill wiper and, tentatively, to the 2019 DEADWOOD wiper (since adopted by Agrius), and industry reporting has suspected ties to later Shamoon waves. Its phishing has used fake aviation job postings. As Peach Sandstorm (Microsoft), it ran password-spray campaigns against thousands of organizations from 2023 and deployed the custom Tickler backdoor in 2024.

Triage signal: High-volume password spraying across many tenants. One successful sign-in among thousands of failures is the event that matters, especially if new Azure subscriptions or virtual machines appear in the tenant afterward.

Nation-state · Iran Microsoft: Peach Sandstorm · GTIG: BLEAK ION · CrowdStrike: Refined Kitten

Source: ATT&CK G0064

Charming Kitten APT35 / Mint Sandstorm / Magic Hound

Iranian group conducting espionage against academics, human rights activists, and government entities through phishing, fake social personas and credential harvesting. It is known for impersonating journalists and think tanks, has supported Iran’s surveillance and foreign intelligence collection for over a decade, and is still active.

Triage signal: Long, friendly email or messaging conversations, often from someone posing as a journalist, researcher or event organizer, that end with a credential-harvesting link or a malicious file. The early messages carry no payload, so user reports matter.

Nation-state · Iran Microsoft: Mint Sandstorm (formerly Phosphorus) · GTIG: RICH ION · ATT&CK: Magic Hound

Source: ATT&CK G0059

Cl0p MOVEit / mass exploitation

Russian-speaking extortion group (TA505/FIN11-adjacent) that industrialized mass exploitation of file-transfer software: Accellion FTA (2020-21), GoAnywhere MFT (2023), MOVEit Transfer (2023), which alone touched 2,700+ organizations, and Cleo Harmony/VLTrader/LexiCom (2024). In late 2025 an extortion wave under the Cl0p brand followed zero-day exploitation of Oracle E-Business Suite (CVE-2025-61882), though Google/Mandiant had not formally attributed the intrusions. Cl0p began as ransomware in 2019, but these campaigns skip encryption in favor of pure data-theft extortion at scale: one zero-day monetized across thousands of victims at once.

Triage signal: Exploitation of an internet-facing file-transfer server: web shells or new admin accounts on MOVEit, GoAnywhere or Cleo hosts, and large downloads from them. The first sign many victims saw was the extortion email, so check these servers the day an advisory lands.

Financially motivated · Russian-speaking Microsoft: Lace Tempest (per Microsoft’s MOVEit reporting) · Mandiant: FIN11 overlap

Source: CISA AA23-158ASource: GTIG (2025)

DragonForce ransomware cartel

Ransomware operation that appeared in late 2023 with encryptors built from leaked LockBit and Conti code. In March 2025 it rebranded as a “cartel” that lets affiliates run attacks under their own brands on its infrastructure. Its encryptor was used in the April 2025 Marks & Spencer attack, where Scattered Spider carried out the intrusion, and it claimed the Co-op attack the same month.

Triage signal: The brand on the ransom note may say little about who was inside. Work the intrusion evidence (help-desk resets, remote-access tools, ESXi access), not the note.

Financially motivated · RaaS Microsoft and ATT&CK: no dedicated name

Source: BleepingComputer (2025)

Evil Corp Dridex / WastedLocker

Russian cybercrime group behind the Dridex banking trojan and BitPaymer / WastedLocker ransomware, which stole hundreds of millions from financial institutions worldwide. U.S. Treasury sanctioned the group and its alleged leader Maksim Yakubets in 2019, and it has since rotated malware names to evade sanctions and tracking. In October 2024, coordinated UK/US/Australian sanctions detailed the group’s ties to Russian intelligence (FSB) and identified senior member Aleksandr Ryzhenkov as a LockBit affiliate.

Triage signal: Fake browser updates (SocGholish) leading to Cobalt Strike, then ransomware under a rotating name. Before any ransom payment, legal must check the strain and the actor against sanctions lists: a payment to a sanctioned group may itself violate sanctions.

Financially motivated · Russia Microsoft: Manatee Tempest · CrowdStrike: Indrik Spider

Source: ATT&CK G0119Source: U.S. Treasury (2024)

FIN7 Carbanak / Bateleur

Well-organized cybercrime group conducting large-scale intrusions against banks, POS systems, and hospitality: financially motivated but operationally on par with nation-state actors. Used Carbanak and Bateleur malware (ATT&CK tracks the Carbanak group separately), phishing, backdoors and supply-chain compromise. Recruited unwitting IT staff through fake security firms (Combi Security before the 2018 arrests, Bastion Secure afterward), was later linked to REvil, DarkSide and other ransomware operations, and sold the AvNeutralizer EDR-killer to other ransomware crews.

Triage signal: Malicious ads and look-alike download sites delivering fake installers for popular software (including MSIX packages), PowerShell loaders, and EDR-killer tools before ransomware. A signed installer from an unexpected publisher followed by PowerShell is worth a look.

Financially motivated · Eastern Europe-based Microsoft: Sangria Tempest (per Microsoft reporting) · GTIG: WILD COMET · CrowdStrike: Carbon Spider

Source: ATT&CK G0046Source: FBI (2018)

HAFNIUM Silk Typhoon / Exchange zero-days

Suspected Chinese state-sponsored group, widely known for exploiting the ProxyLogon Microsoft Exchange zero-days in early 2021, followed by web-shell deployment and data theft from education, law firms, NGOs, and defense contractors. Microsoft now tracks it as Silk Typhoon; in 2025 it pivoted to abusing IT providers’ remote-management and cloud tooling. An alleged member was arrested in Italy in July 2025 and extradited to the U.S. in 2026.

Triage signal: Web shells and new child processes under internet-facing servers (Exchange, SharePoint, edge devices), and, in its current form, stolen API keys and remote-management access at IT providers used to reach their customers’ cloud tenants.

Nation-state · China Microsoft: Silk Typhoon (formerly HAFNIUM)

Source: ATT&CK G0125Source: Microsoft (2025)

LAPSUS$ Okta, Microsoft, Nvidia

Loosely organized group known for extortion, data leaks, and high-profile breaches. It got in through SIM swapping, credential theft and insider recruitment rather than malware, and courted media attention with public leaks. Members were believed to be primarily teenagers, and UK arrests and convictions followed. It favored disruption and publicity over stealth, and the name resurfaced in 2025 alongside Scattered Spider and ShinyHunters.

Triage signal: SIM swaps and help-desk calls that reset MFA, MFA-fatigue prompts, and bought or insider-supplied credentials, followed by access to source code, ticketing and chat systems. A help-desk MFA reset followed by a sign-in from a new device deserves a look.

Financially motivated · UK/Brazil-based Microsoft: Strawberry Tempest · CrowdStrike: Slippy Spider

Source: ATT&CK G1004

Lazarus Group North Korea / RGB

Umbrella term for several North Korean operations under the Reconnaissance General Bureau, spanning espionage, sabotage, and financially motivated attacks: Sony Pictures, WannaCry, bank and crypto-exchange theft. It blends APT tradecraft with cybercrime to fund the regime. Its TraderTraitor cluster (Microsoft: Jade Sleet) stole about $1.5B from the Bybit exchange in February 2025, and a sister cluster (Jasper Sleet) places fake remote IT workers inside Western companies, now a routine hiring and insider-threat triage scenario.

Triage signal: Fake job offers and coding tests that deliver malware to developers and cryptocurrency staff, trojanized npm or PyPI packages, and, for the IT-worker scheme, a new hire whose remote access comes from a laptop farm or a remote-desktop tool. See DPRK Remote IT Workers.

Nation-state · North Korea Microsoft: Diamond Sleet; related: Jade Sleet, Sapphire Sleet, Jasper Sleet · CrowdStrike: Labyrinth Chollima

Source: ATT&CK G0032Source: FBI PSA (2025)

LockBit RaaS at scale

The most deployed ransomware-as-a-service operation of 2022-2023, responsible for thousands of victims across every sector. Ran a professionalized affiliate program with a slick leak site, bug bounties, and payment discipline. Operation Cronos seized its infrastructure in February 2024, and in May 2024 the same taskforce named and sanctioned its leader, Dmitry Khoroshev. The brand nonetheless returned as LockBit 5.0 in September 2025, with Windows, Linux and ESXi builds: takedowns degrade RaaS programs rather than end them.

Triage signal: Affiliates vary, so the way in does too: exposed RDP or VPN, edge-device exploits, stolen credentials. A late but clear warning is a new or edited Group Policy object that disables Defender or creates scheduled tasks across the domain to push the encryptor.

Financially motivated · RaaS CrowdStrike: Bitwise Spider · Status (Oct 2026): active again as LockBit 5.0

Source: CISA AA23-165ASource: Check Point (2025)

Play Playcrypt / closed group

Ransomware group active since June 2022 that CISA and its partners describe as presumed to be a closed group rather than an open RaaS program; by May 2025 about 900 organizations had been affected. Ways in have included FortiOS flaws (CVE-2018-13379, CVE-2020-12812), Exchange ProxyNotShell, exposed RDP and VPN, and in 2025 SimpleHelp remote-support software (CVE-2024-57727). It uses intermittent encryption (encrypting only parts of each file, for speed) and has an ESXi variant.

Triage signal: FortiOS or remote-support exploits and exposed RDP for entry, AdFind and the Grixba scanner for discovery, WinRAR for staging and WinSCP for exfiltration, then intermittent encryption. Grixba or AdFind on a server with no admin reason is a clear warning.

Financially motivated · Closed group ATT&CK: G1040 · Microsoft: no actor name for the brand (affiliates tracked separately)

Source: CISA AA23-352A

Qilin Agenda / healthcare disruption

Ransomware-as-a-service operation, also called Agenda, active since at least 2022, with Go and later Rust encryptors for Windows, Linux and VMware ESXi. Its June 2024 attack on Synnovis, a pathology provider to London NHS hospitals, halted blood testing and forced postponed operations and appointments. Several trackers ranked it the most active ransomware brand of 2025, helped by affiliates arriving from disrupted operations.

Triage signal: Stolen VPN or remote-access credentials, often without MFA, then Group Policy or ESXi access to deploy the encryptor. One 2024 intrusion used a Group Policy logon script to harvest passwords saved in Chrome across the domain. Hypervisor sign-ins outside change windows are the tell.

Financially motivated · RaaS ATT&CK: S1242 (software) · Microsoft: no actor name for the brand (affiliates tracked separately)

Source: ATT&CK S1242

Salt Typhoon telecom espionage

Chinese state-sponsored group behind the 2024 intrusions into major U.S. telecommunications providers, where it reached lawful-intercept systems and the call records of political figures. It gets in through edge routers and other network devices and alters router configurations to stay. The August 2025 joint advisory AA25-239A, co-signed by agencies from over a dozen countries, describes the same activity against telecom, government, transportation, lodging and military networks worldwide.

Triage signal: The evidence lives in network-device configurations and logs, not on endpoints: unexpected configuration changes, new local accounts, GRE tunnels or packet-capture settings on routers, and SSH or management access from unfamiliar addresses.

Nation-state · China Microsoft: Salt Typhoon · CrowdStrike: Operator Panda · also tracked as GhostEmperor and RedMike

Source: CISA AA25-239A

Sandworm APT44 / GRU / destructive ops

Destructive GRU unit behind the 2015 / 2016 Ukraine power grid attacks (BlackEnergy, Industroyer) and the global NotPetya wiper. Its tools include VPNFilter, KillDisk and Cyclops Blink. It specializes in industrial control system and operational technology (ICS/OT) disruption, hybrid warfare, and psychological operations aligned with Russian military objectives.

Triage signal: Destructive activity launched through the victim’s own management tools: Group Policy or scheduled tasks pushing a wiper, and changes to OT or SCADA systems. Confirmed wiper activity fires the escalation tripwire.

Nation-state · Russia (GRU) Microsoft: Seashell Blizzard · GTIG: SANDWORM RELIC (formerly APT44) · CrowdStrike: Voodoo Bear

Source: ATT&CK G0034

Scattered Spider UNC3944 / Octo Tempest

Native-English-speaking group behind the 2023 MGM and Caesars intrusions and the defining identity-attack playbook: help-desk social engineering, SIM swapping, MFA fatigue, AiTM phishing kits, then abuse of the victim’s own identity provider (IdP) and cloud tooling. It overlaps with the loose “The Com” ecosystem and later partnered with RaaS operations for encryption. In April 2025 it hit UK retail (M&S, Co-op, Harrods); at M&S, DragonForce’s encryptor was deployed on VMware ESXi hosts. UK arrests followed in July 2025. U.S. prosecutors charged Thalha Jubair over at least 120 intrusions and $115M in ransoms, and in July 2026 Jubair and Owen Flowers were sentenced in the UK for the 2024 Transport for London hack. The NCA says the action effectively halted the group, but its playbook (help-desk resets, MFA re-registration, hypervisor encryption) is widely copied. The actor profile most relevant to single sign-on (SSO) era triage.

Triage signal: A help-desk call that resets a password or MFA method, followed within minutes by a sign-in from a new device, a new MFA registration, remote-access tools, and access to the identity provider, vCenter or ESXi. Verify the caller out of band before the reset; after it, check the account’s new devices and methods.

Financially motivated · UK/US-based Microsoft: Octo Tempest · Mandiant: UNC3944 · CrowdStrike: Scattered Spider

Source: ATT&CK G1015Source: NCA (2026)

ShinyHunters data-theft extortion

Financially motivated crew that has stolen and sold or leaked large databases since 2020. Public reporting links it to the 2024 Snowflake customer-account thefts and, in 2025, to voice-phishing calls that talked staff into authorizing a malicious connected app in Salesforce, followed by extortion. In August 2025 it surfaced with Scattered Spider and LAPSUS$ remnants under the “Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters” banner. There is no encryption: the stolen data is the leverage, so the case is a breach investigation from the first hour.

Triage signal: A voice-phishing call followed by a new connected app or OAuth authorization in Salesforce or another SaaS platform, then bulk API exports. SaaS audit logs (connected-app installs, API query volume) carry it; endpoints see nothing.

Financially motivated · data-theft extortion GTIG: UNC6040 (voice phishing), UNC6240 (extortion)

SilverTerrier Nigerian BEC

Collective term for Nigerian actors conducting Business Email Compromise fraud. Less technically advanced than APTs but highly profitable, they use phishing, credential theft and social engineering to divert funds from corporate communications. Many operate openly on social media, and hundreds of arrests have not stopped the activity.

Triage signal: A mailbox compromise followed by inbox rules that hide replies, a look-alike domain in a payment thread, and a request to change bank details. Verify any payment change by calling a number you already hold.

Financially motivated · Nigeria ATT&CK: G0083

Source: ATT&CK G0083

Storm-2372 device code phishing

Cluster Microsoft has tracked since August 2024 running device code phishing against government, NGO, IT, defense, telecom, health, higher-education and energy organizations. Operators build rapport over WhatsApp, Signal or Microsoft Teams, then send a fake Teams meeting invite that leads the target to enter an attacker-generated device code, handing over tokens. From February 2025 it used the Microsoft Authentication Broker client ID to register devices and obtain Primary Refresh Tokens. Microsoft assesses with moderate confidence that it aligns with Russian state interests, and a later update to its report places it as an initial-access sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard.

Triage signal: Device code sign-ins (authentication protocol “deviceCode” in Entra ID sign-in logs) by users who never use device-code apps, often right after a meeting invite from a new contact, then device registration through the Authentication Broker client.

Nation-state · Russia-aligned Microsoft: Storm-2372

Source: Microsoft (2025)

TA505 large-scale malware ops

Prolific cybercriminal group distributing banking trojans, ransomware, and RATs globally through massive phishing waves delivering Dridex, FlawedAmmyy and Locky. It often acts as an initial-access broker for other groups and frequently shifts tactics, payloads, and infrastructure: an example of the malware-as-a-service model.

Triage signal: Mostly historical. Mass phishing with malicious attachments that load a downloader, then remote-access tools. Its later file-transfer extortion campaigns are covered under Cl0p.

Financially motivated · Russian-speaking Microsoft: Spandex Tempest · CrowdStrike: Graceful Spider

Source: ATT&CK G0092

Turla FSB / long-running espionage

Long-running Russian cyber-espionage group linked to the FSB that targets governments, embassies and militaries. Custom implants include Snake (whose global network the FBI disabled in Operation MEDUSA, May 2023), Carbon, and Kazuar. It hijacks other actors’ infrastructure to obscure attribution: Microsoft and Lumen reported in December 2024 that it had been running operations from a Pakistani group’s (Storm-0156) hijacked C2 servers since late 2022. Watering holes, poisoned updates and compromised email systems round out tradecraft built for longevity and covertness.

Triage signal: Rarely seen directly. The signs are long-lived, low-volume implants on servers, C2 through compromised websites or another actor’s infrastructure, and mail-server backdoors that take commands by email. Record the behavior and leave attribution to threat intelligence.

Nation-state · Russia (FSB) Microsoft: Secret Blizzard · GTIG: TURLA RELIC · CrowdStrike: Venomous Bear

Source: ATT&CK G0010Source: CISA AA23-129A

Volt Typhoon critical-infrastructure prepositioning

Chinese state-sponsored group that pre-positions inside U.S. critical infrastructure (energy, water, communications, transportation) for potential disruptive action rather than day-to-day espionage. Its defining tradecraft is living off the land: built-in tools, valid accounts, and hands-on-keyboard operation with almost no malware, which defeats IOC-driven detection. It relayed traffic through compromised SOHO routers (the KV botnet, disrupted by the FBI in January 2024). Disclosed May 2023 by Microsoft and CISA; the campaign itself is covered under notable campaigns below.

Triage signal: Built-in tools used with valid accounts: ntdsutil or vssadmin copying ntds.dit, netsh port proxies, WMI and PowerShell discovery, and sign-ins relayed through small-office routers. There is no malware to catch, so baseline administrative activity.

Nation-state · China Microsoft: Volt Typhoon · CrowdStrike: Vanguard Panda

Source: ATT&CK G1017

Wizard Spider Ryuk / Conti / TrickBot

Russia-based cybercriminal group that ran Ryuk, Conti, and TrickBot and extorted hundreds of millions from hospitals, municipalities and corporations. It operated within a larger ecosystem of initial access brokers and malware developers, with fast lateral movement, data theft and double extortion, usually after TrickBot or BazarLoader infections. That era ended in 2022, when Conti shut down and TrickBot and BazarLoader went quiet; members dispersed into successor ransomware brands.

Triage signal: Historical as a brand; the sequence still recurs. A loader infection (TrickBot, BazarLoader), Cobalt Strike within hours, domain discovery with AdFind, then encryption across the domain. The loader on the first host is the earliest and cheapest point to stop it.

Financially motivated · Russia Microsoft: Periwinkle Tempest · CrowdStrike: Wizard Spider · Status (Oct 2026): defunct as a brand since 2022

Source: ATT&CK G0102

Notable campaigns and breaches

High-impact, widely analyzed intrusions and operations that shaped modern security thinking. Campaign cards were last reviewed in October 2026.

Vocabulary for: Uncover

Cambridge Analytica

Political consulting firm that improperly harvested data from 87 million Facebook users via a quiz app; the scandal broke in 2018. Psychological profiling and micro-targeted ads aimed at influencing votes, most prominently the 2016 U.S. election (the UK ICO’s investigation later concluded its role in Brexit had been overstated). Not a traditional cyberattack, but it exposed serious flaws in data privacy and third-party app oversight and triggered global debate about surveillance capitalism and election interference. Direct consequences included a record $5 billion FTC penalty against Facebook (July 2019) and the UK ICO’s maximum £500,000 fine under pre-GDPR law. GDPR itself was adopted in 2016 and became applicable on May 25, 2018, about ten weeks after the story broke.

Triage lesson: No intrusion at all: access the platform granted was used far beyond its purpose. Third-party apps and API consumers holding your users’ data deserve the scrutiny you give attackers.

Source: US FTC (2019)

Change Healthcare

February 2024 ransomware attack on the largest U.S. health-claims clearinghouse by an ALPHV/BlackCat affiliate. Entry came through a Citrix remote-access portal protected by a stolen password and no MFA. Claims processing and pharmacy payments stalled nationwide for weeks; the company paid a reported $22M ransom, and the data of roughly 190 million people was exposed, the largest healthcare breach on record. ALPHV then exit-scammed the affiliate.

Triage lesson: One remote-access portal without MFA was enough. A password-only sign-in to an internet-facing portal is worth an alert, and an outage at a single critical vendor is your incident too.

Source: HHS OCR

Cloud Hopper

Widespread espionage campaign by China’s APT10 targeting MSPs globally. Compromising MSPs gave attackers stealthy access to customer networks across aerospace, finance, manufacturing, and healthcare. Credential theft, custom malware, and RATs. Victims often unaware due to the trusted MSP position. A textbook example of supply-chain compromise for espionage. The actor is profiled above under APT10.

Triage lesson: Activity from a trusted provider’s accounts is not trusted activity. Know which provider accounts and tools touch your environment, and when they should.

Source: CISA TA17-117A

Colonial Pipeline

May 2021 ransomware incident attributed to DarkSide that hit the IT systems of one of the largest fuel pipeline operators in the U.S. The company preemptively shut down operations, causing East Coast shortages. Initial access came through a compromised VPN password. A $4.4M ransom was paid and partly recovered by the U.S. government. Spurred new cybersecurity mandates for pipeline operators.

Triage lesson: A legacy VPN account with no MFA, no longer in use, was the way in. A dormant account that still authenticates deserves an alert, and IT-side ransomware can stop operations even when OT is untouched.

Source: CISA AA21-131A

Equifax breach

2017 breach exposing PII (SSNs, birth dates, addresses) for 147 million Americans. Caused by failure to patch Apache Struts (CVE-2017-5638). Attackers operated undetected for roughly 76 days. Handling and disclosure drew widespread criticism. Resulted in a historic $700M settlement and regulatory reforms focused on data protection.

Triage lesson: A known, patchable flaw in an internet-facing application, and an expired certificate on the inspection device that left the traffic unmonitored for months. A monitoring gap is a finding, not background noise.

Source: US FTC

HAFNIUM Exchange

Early 2021 ProxyLogon chain of zero-day exploits in Microsoft Exchange Server (CVE-2021-26855, -26857, -26858, -27065), first used by HAFNIUM (now Silk Typhoon) and then by many other groups. Tens of thousands of organizations were affected worldwide across government, academia and business. Web shells were deployed for data theft, persistence, and lateral movement, and Microsoft issued out-of-band patches. Not to be confused with the later ProxyShell wave (August 2021). Exchange Server 2016 and 2019 reached end of support in October 2025, so surviving on-premises servers carry this risk unpatched.

Triage lesson: After a mass-exploited server flaw, patching is not enough: hunt for web shells and new accounts planted before the patch.

Source: CISA AA21-062A

Log4Shell

CVE-2021-44228, a critical remote code execution (RCE) flaw in Apache Log4j. Attacker-controlled input is interpolated into a log message that triggers a JNDI lookup to an attacker’s server. On older JVMs that server hands back a class to run; on patched JVMs exploitation used gadget chains, and even failed attempts leaked environment secrets through DNS lookups (a key triage clue). Disclosed December 2021 and exploited globally within hours, it affected vast swaths of Java applications, renewed calls for software bills of materials and open-source security funding, and reset assumptions about transitive-dependency risk.

Triage lesson: Exploit strings arrived in any logged field (user agents, form fields, chat names). Outbound LDAP or DNS lookups from servers that never make them were the clearest early signal; knowing where a vulnerable library runs decides how fast you can scope the next one.

Technique detail: Log4Shell (CVE-2021-44228).

Source: CISA AA21-356A

MOVEit Transfer mass exploitation

May–June 2023 zero-day SQL-injection in Progress Software’s MOVEit Transfer (CVE-2023-34362), exploited at scale by the Cl0p ransomware group. Thousands of organizations were affected through the vendor’s customer base, including U.S. federal agencies, state DMVs and Fortune 500 firms. A defining case for third-party-software risk and for ransomware groups shifting from encryption to pure data extortion. The actor is profiled above under Cl0p.

Triage lesson: The first evidence many victims saw was the extortion email. Know which internet-facing file-transfer servers you run, and hunt them the day an advisory lands.

Source: CISA AA23-158A

NotPetya

Destructive cyberattack masquerading as ransomware, attributed to Russia’s GRU Sandworm. Spread via a compromised update to Ukrainian accounting software (MeDoc), then jumped globally. It irreversibly wiped disks despite the ransom note. Maersk, Merck and FedEx were among the victims, damages ran into the billions, and it remains a defining case study in supply-chain abuse.

Triage lesson: A ransom note does not make an event ransomware: check whether recovery is even possible. A trusted vendor’s software update can be the infection path.

Source: CISA (2017)

Okta support-system breach

October 2023 intrusion of Okta’s customer support case-management system. Attackers used a service-account credential that an employee had saved to their personal Google account, which was signed in to Chrome on the employee’s Okta-managed laptop. They used it to access HAR files that customers had uploaded for troubleshooting. Some of those files contained valid session tokens. Okta later disclosed that the attacker also downloaded a report containing the names and email addresses of all its customer-support-system users. Drove home that “support” surfaces handle production credentials and need the same identity-provider rigor as the products themselves.

Triage lesson: Files customers upload to support (HAR files, logs) can hold live session tokens. Sanitize them before upload, and treat a support-system breach as possible session theft for every customer whose files it held.

Source: Okta RCA (2023)Source: Okta Security

Operation Aurora

2009–2010 China-attributed intrusions targeting Google, Adobe, and dozens of others. Zero-day in Internet Explorer used to deploy backdoors and steal source code and IP. Google’s public disclosure was a turning point in public discussion of state-sponsored industrial espionage and APTs.

Triage lesson: Historical. It made targeted, state-sponsored intrusion part of corporate threat models: a browser zero-day against chosen employees, aimed at source code.

Source: Google (2010)

Operation ShadowHammer

2019 supply-chain compromise of the ASUS software update utility. Compromised updates were signed and shipped from ASUS’s own servers, reaching hundreds of thousands. The payload activated only on specific targets (matched by MAC address), suggesting selective espionage. It combined stolen code-signing certificates with supply-chain trust and has been linked to nation-state-capable APT activity.

Triage lesson: A vendor-signed update from the vendor’s own server can still be malicious. The signature and the source tell you who shipped it, not whether it is safe.

Source: Kaspersky Securelist

OPM breach

2015 breaches exposing 21.5 million SF-86 background-investigation records, including 5.6 million fingerprint sets, plus 4.2 million personnel files. Attributed to Chinese state-sponsored actors, the stolen files gave a foreign intelligence service a map of who holds U.S. security clearances. Major reforms in U.S. government cybersecurity practices and incident response readiness followed.

Triage lesson: Some stolen data can never be reset. Fingerprints and background-investigation files stay sensitive for life, which raises the impact of any access to them.

Source: US GAO

Salesloft Drift OAuth-token theft

August 2025. An actor tracked by Google as UNC6395 used OAuth tokens stolen from the Salesloft Drift chat integration to export data from hundreds of customers’ Salesforce instances, then searched the data for secrets such as cloud access keys and passwords. No victim password or MFA was involved: the trusted SaaS-to-SaaS integration was the way in.

Triage lesson: Third-party OAuth grants are credentials. Bulk API exports by an integration’s identity, outside its normal pattern, are the signal, and revoking and rotating the grants is part of containment.

Source: GTIG (2025)

Shai-Hulud npm worm

September 2025. A self-propagating worm in the npm ecosystem stole developer and continuous integration (CI) tokens from infected machines, then used stolen npm credentials to publish trojanized versions of the victims’ own packages, compromising more than 500 packages.

Triage lesson: In a package ecosystem, a developer workstation is an initial-access vector for every downstream consumer. Install scripts that read tokens or publish packages from a workstation or CI runner are the tell; npm, GitHub and cloud tokens on an affected host must be rotated.

Source: CISA (2025)

SharePoint ToolShell

July 2025 mass exploitation of on-premises Microsoft SharePoint (CVE-2025-53770, a variant of the CVE-2025-49704/-49706 chain). Attackers planted web shells and stole the servers’ ASP.NET machine keys, which let them keep forging valid requests even after patching. Microsoft attributed exploitation to several China-based actors, one of which deployed ransomware.

Triage lesson: For edge and server zero-days, patching is not remediation. Rotate the stolen keys (here the ASP.NET machine keys) and hunt for web shells, such as spinstall0.aspx, planted before the patch.

Source: CISA (2025)

Snowflake customer-account theft

April–June 2024. A threat group later tracked as UNC5537 used credentials harvested from infostealer logs to access Snowflake customer environments that had no MFA configured. Victims included Ticketmaster, Santander, AT&T and LendingTree. This was not a Snowflake CVE: it was a customer-side identity-hygiene failure at scale. Snowflake responded by making MFA the default and phasing out password-only sign-ins.

Triage lesson: Infostealer logs turned old passwords into working sign-ins wherever MFA was missing. Password-only sign-ins to a SaaS data platform from an unfamiliar client deserve an alert.

Source: Mandiant / Google

SolarWinds SUNBURST

Late-2020 supply-chain compromise of SolarWinds Orion. A trojanized update gave APT29 (then tracked as UNC2452) backdoor access to thousands of customers including U.S. government agencies and Fortune 500 firms. Against a chosen few it then ran months of stealthy command-and-control, lateral movement with forged SAML tokens, and data exfiltration. It reshaped trust assumptions around software vendors.

Triage lesson: The intrusion arrived in a signed update, then moved to the cloud with forged SAML tokens (Golden SAML). Sign-ins with no matching identity-provider event, and unusual DNS from a management server, were the signals.

Source: CISA AA20-352A

Sony Pictures hack

2014 destructive attack attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, reportedly in retaliation for The Interview. Wiper malware destroyed systems while the attackers leaked unreleased films and executive communications, blending political retaliation, information warfare, and corporate sabotage. It was the first high-profile nation-state attack on a private company over content.

Triage lesson: Destruction and data theft arrived together. A wiper case can also be a breach case, so scope what left as well as what was destroyed.

Source: FBI (2014)

Storm-0558 / Antique Typhoon (Microsoft cloud email)

July 2023 intrusion in which a China-aligned actor (now tracked by Microsoft as Antique Typhoon) forged Azure AD (now Microsoft Entra ID) access tokens using a stolen Microsoft consumer-MSA signing key, reading emails of ~25 organizations including U.S. State Department and Commerce officials via Outlook Web Access. The key should not have signed enterprise tokens; a validation gap let it. The U.S. Cyber Safety Review Board’s April 2024 review detailed the Microsoft operational and strategic decisions that led to the intrusion. It reshaped how the industry talks about identity-provider key custody, token binding, and the blast radius of a single signing key.

Triage lesson: A customer found it first: a U.S. State Department team spotted unusual mailbox access in audit logs (MailItemsAccessed) it had paid to enable. Logging you have not enabled is evidence you will not have.

Source: Microsoft (2023)

Stuxnet

Landmark cyberweapon widely attributed to a joint U.S.-Israeli operation (never officially acknowledged) to disrupt Iran’s nuclear enrichment. Multiple zero-days and PLC-specific payloads targeted Siemens controllers at Natanz. It altered centrifuge speeds while reporting normal readings: the first malware known to cause real-world industrial damage, and the template for later ICS-targeting malware.

Triage lesson: The monitoring screens were part of the attack. When the impact claim rests on what a system reports about itself, look for an independent view of the same process.

Source: CISA ICSA-10-272-01

Target breach

2013 breach exposing payment card data for about 40 million accounts and, as a separate data set, names, mailing addresses, phone numbers or email addresses for up to 70 million people. Initial access came through a compromised HVAC contractor’s credentials; the attackers moved laterally to POS systems, where malware on the registers captured card data. A landmark for third-party risk management and network segmentation, it cost hundreds of millions and led to executive resignations.

Triage lesson: The malware alerts fired, and the response did not follow. A contractor’s credentials opened the network; the triage failure was alerts left unworked.

Source: U.S. Senate Commerce Committee (2014)

Ukraine power grid

2015 and 2016 attacks marking the first known successful cyberattacks to cause power outages. Attributed to Russia’s Sandworm. In 2015, spear-phishing planted BlackEnergy 3 in the business networks. Stolen credentials and VPN access then let the attackers reach the ICS networks and open breakers remotely, hands-on-keyboard, through the utilities’ own remote-administration tools and HMI software. KillDisk wipes, firmware-bricked serial-to-Ethernet devices, and a telephone denial-of-service against a call center slowed the response. The utilities restored service by switching to manual operations. About 225,000 customers lost power. In 2016, Industroyer / CrashOverride automated the attack against grid-specific protocols. Defining examples of cyber warfare against civilian infrastructure.

Triage lesson: The attackers used the operators’ own remote-administration tools. In OT, a legitimate tool used at the wrong time or by the wrong account is the signal, and recovery may mean manual operation.

Source: CISA IR-ALERT-H-16-056-01

Volt Typhoon / Salt Typhoon

Two long-running China-linked campaigns against critical infrastructure. Volt Typhoon: disclosed May 2023 by Microsoft and CISA, it pre-positioned in U.S. energy, water, communications, and transportation networks using living-off-the-land techniques for stealthy persistence. Salt Typhoon: disclosed in late 2024, it compromised major U.S. telecom carriers’ lawful-intercept systems with potential access to call metadata and the federal wiretap apparatus. An August 2025 advisory co-sealed by agencies from 13 countries tied overlapping activity to compromises of backbone, provider-edge and customer-edge routers across telecommunications, government, transportation, lodging and military networks worldwide, mostly through publicly known CVEs rather than zero-days. Together they reframed the boundary between espionage and prepositioning for disruptive action.

Triage lesson: Pre-positioning looks like administration. Valid accounts, built-in tools and network-device access with no visible data theft do not make the impact low: the purpose may be disruption later.

Source: CISA AA24-038A (2024)Source: CISA AA25-239A (2025)

WannaCry

May 2017 ransomware outbreak using EternalBlue (NSA SMB exploit leaked by Shadow Brokers). It wormed across networks, encrypting files in 150+ countries, and hit the UK NHS hard. Microsoft had released the patch two months earlier, but many systems were unpatched. Attributed to North Korea’s Lazarus Group, it was a wake-up call on patch hygiene.

Triage lesson: A worm leaves no time for queue order. Confirmed spread from host to host meets the lateral-movement criterion, so the case escalates at once, before the ransom notes multiply.

Source: CISA (2017)

XZ Utils backdoor

March 2024. A multi-year social-engineering campaign by a fictitious maintainer (“Jia Tan”) inserted a stealthy backdoor (CVE-2024-3094) into xz/liblzma 5.6.0-5.6.1. It reached rolling and pre-release distributions (Debian testing/unstable, Fedora Rawhide, Kali, openSUSE Tumbleweed) but no major stable release. On systems where a distro-patched sshd loads liblzma through libsystemd, it hooked SSH RSA key verification to give whoever held the attacker’s private key pre-authentication remote code execution. Caught by chance by a Microsoft engineer noticing a 500ms slowdown. A defining open-source supply-chain case and the catalyst for renewed maintainer-trust scrutiny.

Triage lesson: The tell was performance: a half-second SSH slowdown. A small, unexplained change in a trusted component deserves a question, and a trusted maintainer is not a guarantee.

Source: CISA (2024)Source: oss-security (2024)
centrifugemonitorNORMAL63,800 RPM↑ what operators sawactual: 120 / 84,600 RPM
FEATURED

Stuxnet

The watershed cyber-physical weapon. Stuxnet altered centrifuge speeds at Iran’s Natanz facility while feeding operators normal readings on the SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) human-machine interfaces (HMIs). The gap between what the equipment was doing and what the monitors reported is the breakthrough that turned malware into a tool of kinetic effect.

FEATURED

WannaCry: worm spread

WannaCry used the EternalBlue exploit (MS17-010) to propagate through SMB to any unpatched host it could reach. From patient zero, it spread autonomously by scanning local subnets and random IPs, infecting roughly 200,000 systems across 150 countries within 24 hours of the May 12, 2017 outbreak. By the time most SOCs had triaged the first alert, the second wave of hosts was already encrypting. That speed is what “wormable” means in practice: the malware does its own lateral movement; defenders do not get the usual reaction window.

Quiz

B.A.D. self-check

Ten questions across initial access, credentials, command and control, exfiltration, evasion and data exposure. No grades; the point is retention.

Why does Pass-the-Hash work without the attacker ever cracking a password?

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An attacker obtains the krbtgt account hash in an Active Directory domain. What can they do, and what is the real fix?

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Malware using a Domain Generation Algorithm (DGA) defeats static domain blocklists. How?

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What distinguishes password spraying from a classic brute-force attack?

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A user typed their password and approved the MFA prompt on what turned out to be an AiTM phishing page. Is the account safe because MFA was satisfied?

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An alert shows a new 4 GB .7z archive in ProgramData on a file server, followed minutes later by rclone.exe making sustained outbound connections. What is most likely happening?

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A phishing domain resolves to a different set of IP addresses every few minutes. Why does blocking those IPs fail, and what works better?

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A user gets a call from someone claiming to be IT support. Minutes later Quick Assist, then AnyDesk, run on their laptop. Both are signed and allowed. What is the right read?

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A suspicious attachment does nothing in the sandbox: no network traffic, no child processes, no file writes. What should you conclude?

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An employee emails a spreadsheet of patient records to the wrong outside address by mistake. Is it a leak or a breach?

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The B.A.D. Glossary is a living reference, last reviewed October 2026 against MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v19.2. The vocabulary evolves with every campaign, every CVE, every shift in the threat landscape. Contributions and corrections are welcome on GitHub.

Technical details verified . Product names, defaults and retention change; check your own tenant.

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